Gerald D. Lundahl v. Ruth M. Telford (Lundahl) : Opening Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2003
Gerald D. Lundahl v. Ruth M. Telford (Lundahl) :
Opening Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Marlene Telford (Lundahl).
.
This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Lundahl v. Lundahl, No. 20030800 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2003).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/4564
MARLENE TELFORD (LUNDAHL) 
4139 NORTH DEVONSHIRE CIRCLE 
PROVO, UTAH 84604 
In Pro se 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
U
 BRIEF 
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
K F U 
SO 
^ K E T N O - g ^ C S O ^ ^ 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
In re Marriage of: 
GERALD D. LUNDAHL, M.D 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
RUTH M. TELFORD (LUNDAHL) 
Respondent, Appellant 
CASE NUMBER 20030800-CA 
Opening Brief 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
Case No 784449259 
Judge Claudia Laycock 
APPEAL FROM THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
HONORABLE JUDGE CLAUDIA LAYCOCK PRESIDING 
OPENING BRIEF 
MARLENE TELFORD (LUNDAHL) 
4139 North Devonshire Circle 
Provo, Utah 
Tel: (801) 225 2051 
Uah Court of Appeals 
FEB 12 2004 
Pautette Stsgg 
Cteric of the Court 
MARLENE TELFORD (LUNDAHL) 
4139 NORTH DEVONSHIRE CIRCLE 
PROVO, UTAH 84604 
In Pro se 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
In re Marriage of: 
GERALD D. LUNDAHL, M.D 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
RUTH M. TELFORD (LUNDAHL) 
Respondent, Appellant 
CASE NUMBER 20030800-CA 
Opening Brief 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
Case No 784449259 
Judge Claudia Laycock 
APPEAL FROM THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
HONORABLE JUDGE CLAUDIA LAYCOCK PRESIDING 
OPENING BRIEF 
MARLENE TELFORD (LUNDAHL) 
4139 North Devonshire Circle 
Provo, Utah 
Tel: (801) 225 2051 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Statement of case 1 
Summary of Argument 1 
Conclusion 2 
Argument 2 
Chronology of Utah Orders 3-4 
Citation of pleadings 4-7 
Outside Briefs on Utah jurisdiction 6 
California Attorney General Memo/Jurisdiction 8 
2002 California Order/concurrent jurisdiction 8 
California Appellate Court 1996-no ruling on jurisdiction 9 
California Dissolution Registered in Utah by Plaintiff 9 
Schedule of Plaintiffs various Utah Pleadings 11-13 
Plaintiffs insistence on Utah jurisdiction 13-14 
Plaintiffs 1986 California Motion (Utah is venue or jurisdiction) 14-16 
Utah Code: Civil Code Section 5152 16-17 
Children and Respondent lived in Utah 1978 on 17-18 
Both Plaintiff and Respondents Counsels stipulate to Ut Jurisdiction 20 
Utah Attorney General stipulates to validity of Utah jurisdiction 20 
Utah Agencies declare validity of Utah jurisdiction 20 
- l -
California Court[s] Stay motions in favor of Utah jurisdiction 20-21 
Plaintiffs admission of forum shopping 21 
Utah Court Minute Entry denies Plaintiff custody of children 22 
Plaintiffs Stipulation to collect from his Corp. as well as himself 22 
Plaintiff in contempt of Utah Court 22 
Plaintiffs lack of respect for judicial system 23-24 
Plaintiffs filing motion in Federal Court of Appeals 24-25 
Respondents Counsel Esplin's letter to Drake, Plaintiffs counsel 25 
Plaintiff dishonesty concerning ownership of M.D. Diet Centers 26-27 
Plaintiffs affidavit to Utah court: Admission of lying 26 
Respondents Pleadings (affidavits & memo's) re: M.D. Diet 26 
URESA controls orders 27, 45 
Respondent cites Utah Docket as proof of Utah court activities 28 
Utah Court sanctions Plaintiff for contempt & lying 28 
Plaintiff files Doctrine of Laches (Calif); he fails 28-29 
Respondent's list of communication to various agencies 29-30 
Utah Jurisdiction summary 30-31 
Plaintiffs stipulation to Respondent—false information 31 
Summary of Falsehoods by Plaintiff 31-32 
Orange County Department of ORS registers Utah orders 32 
Memorandum of Points & Authorities 32-
Argument against California jurisdiction 44-
The September 22, 2003 Utah Order is under Appeal 42 
Utah Supreme Court re: issues of URESA 46 
Utah rulings on Utah jurisdiction upheld in Utah Courts 48 
Summary outline of jurisdictional issues 50 
-m-
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Despain v. Despain. 610 P2d 1303. et. 1305 7 
Hamilton v. Superior Court, (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 418 14 
Leverett.v Superior Court (1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 126 14 
Worthly v. Worthly (1955) 44 Cal.2d 465 15 
Sharove v. Middleman (1956) 146 Cal.App.2d 199,201 -202 15 
Daves v. Daves (1985) 173 CA 3d. 97 16 
Jagger v .Superior Court (1979) 96 CA 3d. 579 18 
Hafer v. Superior Court (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d, 856 18 
Schlumpfv. Schlumpf (1978) 79 CAL.App. 3d 892 19 
Cowan v. Moreno 903 S.W. 2d @ p. 121 32 
In re Marriage of Adams (1987) 188 CA.App.3d 863 33 
In re Marriage of Griffin (1953) 15 CAL.App. 4th 685,689 33 
Olsen v. Cory (1983) 35 CAL.3d 390, 400 34 
In re Marriage of Ward (1994) 299 Cal.App.4th 1452, 1456-1457 34 
In re Marriage ofPopenhager (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 514, 521-522 34 
Interstate Child Enforcement after United States v. Lopez (Apr 1996) 144-
U.Pa.L Rev. 1469, 1484 34 
Kammersell vs Kammersell (Utah 1990) 792 p.2d 496 34 
Rimensburger v Rimensburger (Utah 1992 )Ct.App. 941 P.2d 709 34,36 
Oglesby v Ogelsby (1973) 510 P.2d 1106, 1107(supra) 35& 37 
Bankler v. Bankler (1998 Utah) 963 P.2d 797, 800 36 
Lambereth v. Lambereth (1976) 550 P.2d 200, 202 38 
State of Utah, Dept Human Services v. Jacoby (Utah 1999) 975 P. 2d 
939.App Ct 40 
Wilde v. Wilde (Utah 1998) 969 P/2d 438, CT App. 41 
In re Marriage of Fox (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 862,873 [225 CR 823] 43 
Stangvik, Supra, 54 Cal.3d at P.752 43 
Shirley v. Superior Court (1992) 4 Cal.App. 4th 126, 133 [6CR2 38] 43 
CF.Atlantic Richfield Co v. Superior Court (1975) 5 lCal.App.3d 168,176 
[124CR63] 43 
Christopher B. (1996) 43 Cal.App. 4th 551, 558,559,[51CR243] 43 
Stephanie M (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295 [27 CR2 595] 43 
Bosclair v. Superior Court (1990) 51 CAL.3d 1140, 1144, fn.l [276 CR62] 44 
Solley V. Solley (1964) 227 Cal.App.2d 522,529 [38 CR 802] 44 
Leferett v. Superior Court (1963) Cal.App.2d 126 [34CR784] 44 
In re Marriage of Aaron Supra, 224 Cal.App.3d 1086, 1095 [274 CR 357] 45 
Estate of Buck supra 29 Cal.App.4th 1846, 1854 [35CR2 442] 45 
Lee v. Gaufin (Utah 1993) 867 P.2d 572,575 47 
Financial Bancorp, Inc Pingree & Dahle (Utah 1994) [**7] Inc. 880 P2d 
14m 16 47 
McClane v. McClane (1977) 570 P.2d 692 49 
In re Marraige of Morrison (1978) 143 Ca; Rptr. 139 573 P.2d 41 49 
-ii-
CODES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
California Code of Civil Procedure; Section 1913 14 
Markey: California Family Law: Section 5106 15 
Utah Civil Code: Section 5152 16-17 
URESA (Uniform Reciprocal Support Act)i.d. p.498-499 i.d.@ p. 710,: 26, 39,48 
UIFSA (Uniform Interstate Family Support Act)Section 606, Comment 9, 
U.L.A. 126 160 (Supp.1994; i,d. A 33 
Former California Civil Code: Section 5124 p. 686 fn 3 33 
Sampson, Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (1966) FAM.i.q. 
Summer 1998, Prefactory note at 403 34 
Former Family California Code, Section 4840 (repealed by stats. 1997, 
ch 19 Section 1 34 
FCCOA, 28 U.S.C.A. 1738b (Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Act 35 
FFCCOA, 28 U.S.C.A. 1738b (f) and (u) 35 
California Code Section 4909 37 
RURESA (Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement Act) 38, 40 
Utah Code Annotated 30-3-5 (revised) 38 
Utah Foreign Judgment Act 38 
Utah Code 77-31-3 (repealed) 39 
Utah Code Ann.77-31-2 (10) and Utah Code Ann.77-31-26 (6) 39 
Family Code Section 4913 41 
Utah Codes Annotated 1953 Section 30-3-3 42 
-iii-
California Code of Civil Procedure:Section 410.30 43 
Witkin, California Procedure, jurisdiction, section 387, p 991 44 
Witkin, California Procedure, 4th ed jurisdiction Section 6(c) p.552 45 
Witkin, California Procedure, 4th ed. jurisdiction, Section 427 (1) p. 1042 45 
Witkin, California Procedure, jurisdiction, Section 80, pp.450 451 45 
Witkin, California Procedure, jurisdiction Section 82, p.452 45 
NRS 130.030; State ex rel. Welfare div v. Vine,( 1983) 99 Nev. 278, 
283, 662 P2d 295, 298 46 
Annotation, Construction & effect of Provision of Uniform Reciprocal 
Enforcement of Support Act NRS 130.280 (1) 
31 ALR 4th 347, 351 (1984): commissioners prefactory note 
9B U.L.A. 382 (1968) 46 
NRS 130.280; Vix V. State of Wisconson, 100 Nev. 495 686, 47 
P.2d 226 
NRS 130-050 47 
NRS 130.020 (emphasis) PI 1 [**6] 47 
Utah Code Ann.@ 77-31-7 (1995) repealed 1997 47 
Utah Code Ann @ 78-45f-604 (supp. 1998) 47 
Utah Code Ann.@ 78-45f-206 (2) (Supp. 1998) 48 
Unites States Constitution, "Full Faith and Credit" [*943] 48 
-IV-
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
MARLENE TELFORD (LUNDAHL) 
4139 NORTH DEVONSHIRE CIRCLE 
PROVO, UTAH 84604 
In Pro se 
In re Marriage of: 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
GERALD D. LUNDAHL, M.D 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
RUTH M. TELFORD (LUNDAHL) 
Respondent, Appellant 
CASE NUMBER 20030800-CA 
OPENING BRIEF 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
Case No 784449259 
Judge Claudia Laycock 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
In the past 26 years, the Utah court has taken jurisdiction over the 
Respondent, who has been a resident of this state since 1977, and personal 
jurisdiction over the Plaintiff, whose domicile is in California. This brief will 
outline how this came about. Never during this period of time did the Utah court 
stay any motion nor transfer jurisdiction to another state. Currently, the honorable 
Judge, Claudia Laycock of the Fourth District trial court, Utah County is 
attempting to nullify this history by ruling (Cite July 21, 2003) that Utah does not 
have "subject matter jurisdiction". Yet, the previous judges ruled otherwise, and 
this, after extensive litigating. 
Summary of Argument 
1. The Respondent argues that the Utah Courts previously ruled that the 
Utah court has both personal and SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION (Cite 476) 
as stipulated by the Honorable Judge Guy Burningham. (Emphasis) This ruling in 
particular finds In pertinent pa r t . . . . 
Findings 
"The Court finds that this Court has continuing 
1 
1 jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the Plaintiff." 
2 Cite 2) 
3 May the Court take judicial notice on pp 14 and 15 of this document where the 
4 Plaintiff filed an Order to Show Cause in California in 1986 alleging that California 
5 does not have subject matter jurisdiction, citing case law and codes of civil 
6 procedure in support of his argument, (emphasis) Moreover, the Plaintiff filed a 
7 motion in the UNITES STATES COURT OF APPEAL, FOR THE NINTH 
8 CIRCUIT, CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA , San Bernardino County, 
9 California dated 26th of June, 2002, for want of "subject matter jurisdiction." The 
10 court of Appeals summarily denied the Plaintiff's request, making it clear that 
11 California does not have subject matter jurisdiction addressing the issue to both 
12 the California and Utah courts.(see attachment) 
13 CONCLUSION 
14 Citing the above information, and stipulating to conclusions of law and 
15 statute in the current brief, the Respondent categorically states that Utah has 
16 Subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction over the Plaintiff regarding 
n the current matters before the court. Subsequently, the Respondent will refer to 
18 law and statute as it relates to current matters in her Memorandum of Points and 
19 Authority, submitting to the court that the Plaintiff has also filed an appeal in the 
20 state of California. Included in this brief is a quoted "duplication" of the brief filed 
21 by the California Attorney General's Office before the California Court of Appeals 
22 as per the court's instruction. The issue at hand: "validating Utah jurisdiction." 
23 Argument 
24 2. The Respondent's focus will be to provide evidence, fact and law that 
25 should convince the court that Utah jurisdiction is and has been the proper venue 
26 for the last 27 years since the dissolution of the marriage in 1977. The 
27 Respondent moved to Utah from California with eight of her 12 children within two 
28 weeks after the divorce was final. The Respondent will proceed to show that the 
1 Plaintiff voluntarily and deliberately acquiesced to the Utah jurisdiction filing 
2 and responding to motions supplemented with affidavits, memorandum, petitions 
3 to modify, etc for the last 26 years. At no time during that period did the Utah 
4 court stay any motions thereby transferring jurisdiction of this case to another 
5 court. See schedule of Utah Orders. (See Minute Entry, jurisdiction discussed 
6 Cite 76) 
7 3. (see Cite Utah Orders) 
8 Cite: 
9 10 1. June, 1979, Calif order registered in Utah w/ 
10 complaint 
l i - 2. Order April 28,1980-Plaintiff summary Judgment 
12 denied 
13 66 3. Stipulation-June 30,1980; Plaintiff agrees to support 
14 increase 
15 63 4. Order July 7,1980-reduced to "family Support" 
16 77 5. Ruling August 4,1981: gifts not part of support orders 
17 86 6. Order Nov., 27,1981, increase to $2500 per mo; Plaintiff 
18 refusal to return children 
19 124,25 7. Minute entry 
20 110-114 8. Stipulation-2200 per month. Utah laws valid; signed by 
21 both attorneys 
22 188 9. Stipulation: June 1,1984: arrears: $13,500 
23 126,27 10. Order July 14,1983; Increase of support to $2500 
24 179 11. Order April 4,1984—Arrears $23,600-$500 bond 
25 187,88 12. Stipulation November 30,1984 
26 I " 13. Stipulation, December 7,1984; plaintiff agrees to 
27 arrears 
28 206,07 14. Order on Order, Jan 22,1991 
15. Order on Order April 24,1991, Utah jurisdiction,$3000 
monthly support 
16 Order Aug., 25,1991; arrears $3500 
17 Order March 10 1993-Utah continuing jurisdiction: 
arrears $29,200 
18. Hearing July 28,1994; Utah jurisdiction 
19. Order. Court Sanctions Plaintiffs dishonesty and 
lies 
20. Utah Order April 13.1995 Personal & Subject Matter 
jurisdiction, (emphasis) 
21. April 28,1999: support arrears: additional $62,991 
OTHER 
1. June 29,1983 Def Supp memorandum—Statue of 
Limitations, Ut Court has Power.Cite Strong v Strong; 
Callisterv Callister 
2. August 15,1983: Ut Minute Entry: Denial of custody-
Plaintiff 
3. December 20,1983-Affidavit: History of Plaintiff 
Pleadings: Custody hearing; Failure to pay family 
support 
4. Jan., 18,1984; Plaintiff in contempt of court-
Respondent attempts to recover Children 
5.1984-Bench warrant for Plaintiff 
6. May 21,1984; Notice of arrearage;$24,816 
7. June, Respondent Affidavit: $3000 per mo support 
8. Jan., 3,1991; Affidavit Resp; Plaintiff brought action in 
Utah; submits to jurisdiction; Agrees to $3000 per mo 
support. 
4 
9. Plaintiff motion to modify decree; 
10. February 5,1991: Reply to petition; Counter; False 
sale of Medical practice 
11. July 19, 91: Respondent Affidavit OSC: Plaintiff bad 
checks; & arrearage 
12. April 7, 92: Petition to Modify: Sale of Medical Practice 
13. October 26, 92: Notice of Deposition Plaintiff 
14. Plaintiff Motion to objection of Commissioner Maetani 
15. Plaintiff Memorandum in support of objection 
16 Memo in opposition to Plaintiffs objection to Maetani; 
History of Plaintiff pleadings. 
17. January 8,1993; Affidavit of Defendant 
18. Plaintiff Stipulation to Collect support from his 
Corporation. 
19. Plaintiff Affidavit admission of lying under oath. 
20. Motion to strike Plaintiffs pleadings re: M.D. Diet 
-failure to be truthful 
21 May 10,1994: Memorandum in support of Defendant's 
motion to strike plaintiffs pleadings and produce 
witnesses. 
22. Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Pla's motion to 
set aside order of July 27,1994 
23. Affidavit in support of motion to strike Pla's 
pleadings—lies about M.D. Diet and current wife's 
involvement 
24. April 27,1995 Minute Entry—Utah has continuing 
jurisdiction 
25. Plaintiff financial declaration (false) 
5 
1 134-136 26. Plaintiff Designation of record to Utah Supreme Court; 
2 No bond filed-dismissed 
3 514 27. May 28, 2002; Affidavit: Additional arrears of 
4 $86,844.48 
5 OUTSIDE BRIEFS ON UTAH JURISDICTION 
6 1018 1. Application to File Amicus Brief 
7 1032 2. Court of Appeal, California 
8 1035 3. Respondent Intervenor: Declaration (California AG) 
9 1045 4. Utah Order (being appealed) 
10 1060 5. Plaintiff, Federal court of appeals (dismissed) 
l i 1063 6. Respondent's Brief (California Attorney General) 
12 1078 7. Amicus Brief 
13 — * 8. Letter brief, California AG-requested by court of 
14 appeals1 
15 - - - * * 9. Letter brief, Amicus Curiae " " "2 
16 Also it might be well to indicate additional activity as representative of 
17 actions in the Utah Court, with both the Plaintiff and Respondent appearing and 
18 represented by Counsel. 
19 197 1) Affidavit, Respondent January 3, 1991 
20 201 2) Petition to Modify, Respon January, 4 th 1991 
21 207 3) Order to Show Cause January 23, 1991 
22 220 4) Petition to Modify, Plaintiff February 5th 1991 
23 221,223 5) Order on Order to show cause April 24th 1991 
24 227 6) Affidavit, Respondent July, 19th 1991 
25 7) Order to show Cause August 20th 1991 
26 
27 'Find attached 
28 I 2 Find attached 
6 
1 244,245 8) Order & Judgement August 25, 1991 
2 247 9) Petition to Modify, Plaintiff April 7th 1992 
3 266 10) Affidavit, Respondent January 8, 1993 
4 272 11) Notice of settlement conference January 26, 1993 
5 295 12) Judgement March 3, 1993 
6 13) Pre-Trial Order March 10, 1993 
7 590,549 14) Order, Court Sanction of Pla. July 28, 1994 
8 (Doc.missing) 15) Memorandum of Law September 2 1994 
9 466 16) Ruling November 14, 1994 
10 469 16) Final Pre-trial December 1, 1994 
l i 477 17) Plaintiff (withdrawal of Counsel) January 3rd 1995 
12 472 18) Hearing January 27, 1995 
13 532,533 19) Order April 3rd 1995 
14 533 20 Affidavit, Respondent 1998 
15 4. The Discretion of the Trial Court in this type of matter is very broad, the 
16 Court sitting as a Court in Equity, to make re-distribution or other modifications of 
17 the original Decree as equity might dictate. In Despain v. Despain, 610 P2d 
18 1303. et. 1305. the Court stated as follows: 
19 Under Utah Law, a Divorce Court sits as a Court in 
20 Equity so far as child custody, support payments and the 
21 like are concerned. It likewise retains continuing 
22 jurisdiction over the parties, and power to make 
23 equitable re-distribution or other modifications of the 
24 original Decree as equity might dictate. In both the 
25 formulation of the original Decree and any modifications 
26 thereof, the Trial Court is vested with broad 
27 discretionary powers, which may be disturbed by an 
28 Appellate Court only in the presence of clear abuse 
1 thereof. 
2 5.. In early 1995, The Respondent wrote the California Attorney General 
3 asking for the assistance of the Attorney General's Office in collecting against 
4 Utah Orders. It wasn't more than a week later when the California AG office sent 
5 a memo to the Orange County District Attorney's Office, Department of child 
6 support requesting collection of the Utah Orders. 
7 California Attorney General's conclus ion p.2, last line "Therefore, 
8 it appears to be established that Utah has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction". 
9 (Emphasis) Memo: Cite: 1085-1086 
10 6. It was after a meeting with the Orange County child support officers that 
n the Plaintiff made the decision to file a motion with the Orange County Superior 
12 Court requesting a hearing regarding the registration of the Utah Orders, citing 
13 jurisdiction and the Doctrine of Laches as his argument. He failed. 
14 7. The Orange County Superior Court ruled in favor of the Respondent after 
15 hearing both arguments and reading the pleadings of both parties. After 
16 considerable deliberation the trial court ruled that both Utah and California have 
17 concurrent jurisdiction, allowing the Utah support Orders to be registered, lifting 
18 all stays against them. (Cite 678-680 ) It was at this point that the Plaintiff 
19 decided to file an appeal in the Appellate Court, Fourth District, Division Three, 
20 the State of California, (emphasis) 
21 8. In the current litigation before the Appellate Court, Fourth District, 
22 Division Three, State of California the Plaintiff is attempting to go back to a past 
23 ruling of the 1997 appellate Court, where the Appellant.(Respondent) Marlene 
24 Telford (Lundahl) attempted to have a 1994 Order set aside from a previous 
25 California ruling on the basis she was denied the opportunity to appear before the 
26 California Court. The issue of jurisdiction was not before the Appellate Court. 
27 (Emphasis). Whereas, the Plaintiff asserts that the California Appellate Court in 
28 its Opinion of 1997 states that "California has exclusive Jurisdiction over Spousal 
8 
1 Support" which is not accurate. The Honorable Commissioner Julee Robinson, of 
2 the Superior Court of Orange County, California who heard the current case 
3 reprimanded Counsel for Plaintiff's suggesting she read the California Opinion 
4 again. ( See Transcript of Court Proceedings (Cite 953-974, Schedule of 
5 Exhibits 998,999 ) 
6 The Court: I just have one question, I believe it's directed to you Ms. 
7 Garland in some of the argument that you put forward you cited in 
8 the original—and this may be wrong but I thought were you citing 
9 the original decision that had been made by our court, Fourth District 
10 Court of Appeal, which was Exhibit "G" which was filed on August 
11 26th, 1997 for the authority that the court found that there was 
12 exclusive jurisdiction. 
13 I read that Opinion thoroughly and I didn't find any such dicta 
14 regarding one court or the other having exclusive jurisdiction. 
15 If anything, in footnote one on page four there was some discussion 
16 that Jurisdiction was not an issue before the Court of Appeals. On 
17 that appeal jurisdiction was not the issue. He stated, Quote, "so we 
18 have jurisdiction all over the Place" 
19 I'm not sure that Jurisdiction is the issue as much as it is the fact that 
20 she was essentially deprived of her right to be present at that hearing 
21 because of some comments that were made to her about what she 
22 did and didn't have to do. 
23 So, the only reference I find in that Court, our own court of Appeals 
24 Decision, was basically saying it would be by virtue of dicta. It's not 
25 essential to the holding that there was some representation at the 
26 Hearing. 
27 Anyway, that jurisdiction was not an issue, that there was jurisdiction 
28 all over the place and that Mrs. Lundahl's Counsel, at least, seems 
1 to feel there was concurrent jurisdiction at that time. Do you note 
2 that as well? 
3 The previous Utah Orders were valid under URESA. UIFSA was not ratified by 
4 the Utah legislature until April 6,1996 and not until January 1, 1998 by the state 
5 of California. Utah support orders were honored by the Riverside County ORS 
6 under URESA. Therefore, the additional support Arrearage, of $3500, $29,200, 
7 $61,100, $62,991 all fall under the federal statutes of URESA, and are 
8 collectable. 
9 9) California Dissolution order registered in Utah by Plaintiff as part 
10 of Utah Decree (emphasis) 
n The California Dissolution Order was submitted and filed in 
12 Utah by the Plaintiff when he and his Utah Counsel Mr. Wooton appeared 
13 before the Utah Court June 27,1978 where the Plaintiff acquiesced to Utah 
14 Jurisdiction by submitting a complaint along with the registration in Utah of 
15 the California 1977 Dissolution Order requesting that the Utah Court act as 
16 the controlling venue. ( Cite 10-24) Along with a Complaint ( Cite 2-4) lines 
17 18-26. Note the upper right corner of page one, where the dissolution document 
18 has been stamped by the Utah Court. This document is certified by the Utah 
19 Court. 
20 The Plaintiff is entitled to a Judgment and Decree of this Court 
21 incorporating the provisions of the Judgement and Decree of the 
22 Superior Court of the State of California and to have said Judgment 
23 and Decree incorporated into and made a part of a Decree of this 
24 fUtah]Court 
25 WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for a judgement and Decree of this 
26 court incorporating the provisions of the Decree of the Superior Court 
27 of the State of California in and for the County of Los Angeles in 
28 Case No SE D336650 ( Cite 10-24 ) 
10 
1 10. The Respondent's argument is that Utah has taken jurisdiction of both 
2 the Respondent and the Plaintiff in divorce matters since 1978, See Utah Court 
3 Docket ( Cite 882 ) 
4 11. The Plaintiff has appeared personally, hired Utah Counsel to represent 
5 him and many times has been the moving party. See SCHEDULE OF VARIOUS 
6 UTAH PLEADINGS-PLAINTIFF) 
7 Noall T. Wooton. Attorney of Record. 
8 Page # Cite 
9 2-4 1) Register of California Dissolution Order/Utah May 9. 1978 
10 2 2) Complaint June 9, 1978 
1 1 6 3) Order to Show Cause June 19, 1978 
12 7 4) Summons June 9, 1978 
13 5 5) Answer of Claim, Counterclaim June 10, 1978 
14 6 6) Motion for Order to Show Cause July 1, 1978 
15 6 8) Answer to Deposition July 10, 1978 
16 8 9) Motion for writ of Assistance July 10,1978 
17 9 10) Answer July 10, 1978 
18 32-34 11). Reply to Counter Claim July 10, 1978 
19 33 12).Affidavit in Support of Motion for writ July 19, 1979 
20 37 13). Order to Show Cause July 19, 1979 
21 46 14). Opposition to Motion for Production of Doc/s Sept 6, 1979 
22 60-61, 57 15). Motion for Summary Judgment (Denied ) Dec 7, 1979 
23 54,55 16) Pla's Statement, Pts of authority, Summ, Judg Dec .27, 1979 
24 60 17). Ruling; Pla's Summary Judgment denied April 14, 1980 
25 62 18). Stipulation July 2, 1980 
26 66,67 19). Motion in Support of Order to show Cause April 17, 1981 
27 64 20) Plaintiff Affidavit April 17, 1981 
28 J 66 21). Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law May 1981 
l l 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
92 22). Acceptance of Service 
Donald R. Jensen Attorney of Record 
Feb., 1982 
110 
106 
129 
124 
134 
150 
156 
Robert M 
23). Stipulation 
24). Order to Show Cause 
25) OSC/Plaintiff Custody 
26) Minute Entry, Pla's motion denied 
27) Designation of Appeal 
28) Affidavit for writ of Assistance 
29) Plaintiff motion denied 
oodv. Attorney of Record 
April 29, 1983 
April 22, 1983 
July 6, 1983 
July 6, 1983 
Aug., 30, 1983 
Dec, 16, 1983 
De., 19, 1983 
163 
169 
167 
176 
186 
188 
190 
192 
234 
220 
225 
220 
247 
259 
284 
286 
374 
362 
30) Motion to Continue hearing 
31) Petition to Modify and Traverse/ Respondent 
32) Notice of taking Deposition 
33) Plaintiff Affidavit 
34) Bench Warrant-Plaintiff 
35). Stipulation 
36). Order on issues previous motion 
37) Plaintiff Surety Bond 
38) Notice of Deposition, Plaintiff 
39) Reply, Pet to Mod; Counter Petition 
40) Plaintiff request for pre-trial settlmt Hearing 
41) Supplemental Memorandum 
42) Petition to Modify 
43) Summons 
44) Plaintiff Memo/support of objection Maetani 
45) Plaintiff Reply Memo supp of objection 
46) Notice of Deposition 
47) Pla's objection to interrogatories, rec: for doc. 
Feb., 9, 1984 
March 15, 1984 
Mar 16, 1984 
May, 16, 1984 
May, 1984 
Nov.,30, 1984 
Dec, 6, 1984 
Jan., 3, 1989 
Jan., 27, 1991 
Feb., 5, 1991 
April, 24th 1991 
Feb., 5, 1991 
April 7, 1992 
Nov., 11,1992 
Mar., 4, 1993 
April 12, 1993 
Feb 3, 1994 
Feb;, 4. 1994 
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1 336 48) Plaintiff s Answers to Interrogatories Feb., 14, 1994 
2 423 49) Plaintiffs letter request for meeting w/Resp March 7, 1994 
3 418 50) Plaintiff s Memorandum in Opposition June 6, 1994 
4 446 51) Plaintiff Memorandum in Opposition August 16, 1994 
5 428 52) Plaintiff Motion to set aside Order Aug., 17, 1994 
6 463 53) Pla, Memo Oppose Def motion to strike Oct., 17, 1994 
7 355 54) Plaintiff Affidavit, lying to court 
8 See other pleadings from 1991 (on page 3 -this document) filed February 8, 
9 2002.There are 47 different motions and added to the above 54 — this comes to a 
10 combined total of 101 Different Court Actions, Motions and Pleadings by the 
11 Plaintiff. 
12 12. The Plaintiffs first Utah Counsel was Noell Wooton, followed by Robert 
13 Moody, Donald Jensen, Richard Allred, Dana Burroughs, Sean Egan, Esq and 
14 David Drake. These parties represented the Plaintiff in his many Utah motions the 
15 Plaintiff filed and responded to, in the Utah jurisdiction. 
16 Jurisdiction vs jurisdiction 
17 13) The primary issue is whether the California Order of 2002 along with 
18 the long list of Utah orders (26) Cite p.3. this document (Cite 976-978 ) are 
19 valid. See also the 1995 and 1998 Utah orders summarizing arrearage that the 
20 Plaintiff owes the Defendant). (Cite 193-197 ) Note Respondent's Affidavit on 
21 Utah jurisdiction: 
22 Plaintiffs insistence on Utah jurisdiction. 
23 14. There is a long history of motions that have been filed by the Plaintiff 
24 in the Utah courts. The Plaintiffs purpose in submitting to and even requesting 
25 the jurisdiction of the Utah courts was based on the courts' reputation for being 
26 conservative in its judgements and rulings, ( Cite Plaintiff's declaration of his 
27 wanting Utah jurisdiction). See Loose copy (enclosed) 
28 The Plaintiff declares: 
13 
1 I have voluntarily traveled all of the way to Utah for the purpose of 
2 submitting myself to the jurisdiction of the State of Utah .. . (Cite p 1) 
3 I indicated in previous declarations and or pleadings that I would be 
4 willing to submit myself to the Utah Courts" 
5 Equally important the Plaintiff asserts: 
6 15. In a motion filed by the Plaintiff in the Superior Court of the State of 
7 California, for the County of Los Angeles, December 18, 1986, the Plaintiff 
8 adamantly proceeds to establish facts demonstrating that California does not 
9 have jurisdiction to hear matters regarding issues of divorce by the parties, 
10 through chronologically submitting numerous dates where the parties filed 
11 motions and appeared in the State of Utah. 
12 1. THIS COURT [California] MUST DISMISS 
13 RESPONDENT'S ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE TO 
14 MODIFY A UTAH ORDER ON THE GROUNDS THAT 
15 THE RESPONDENT HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH 
16 THE UTAH ORDER AS A FOREIGN JUDGMENT IN 
17 THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA. 
18 In the case of Hamilton v. Superior Court. (1974) 37 Cal. App.3d 418, the 
19 court declared that, "a foreign decree can be enforced in this state only by action." 
20 As such, the Court in Hamilton was merely applying well established statutory 
21 law. California Code of Civil Procedure Sec 1913 states: 
22 "The effect of a judicial record of a sister s ta te . . . can 
23 only be enforced here by an action or a special 
24 proceeding." 
25 In the case of Leverett v. Superior Court: (1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 126, the 
26 Court declared, in pertinent part, 
27 "It is now the settled law and policy of California that 
28 foreign—created alimony and support obligations, as 
14 
1 well as child custody awards, unless established as a 
2 foreign judgment in this state not be both enforced and 
3 modified in the California forum" (emphasis) 
4 The Leverett Court also cited with approval the decision in Worthlv v. 
5 Worthlev, (1955) 44 Cal.2d 465, explains that foreign domestic judgment or 
6 Decree once that foreign Decree has been established as a Judgment in this 
7 Sate. 
8 Markey: California Family law. Sec 51.06 [1] relying on Hamilton and CCP 
9 Sec 1913, declares: 
10 "The support and custody provisions in a foreign 
11 judgment or decree may not be modified by the courts of 
12 this state until the foreign judgment is first established 
13 as a California judgment. This may be done by filing a 
14 civil action or special proceeding to establish the foreign 
15 judgment as a California judgment. (Emphasis) 
16 2. THIS COURT MUST DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S 
17 ASSERTION THAT ONLY CALIFORNIA HAS 
18 EXCLUSIVE CONTINUING JURISDICTION. ON THE 
19 GROUNDS THAT THE CALIFORNIA COURT LACKS 
20 SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION (emphasis) 
21 In the case of Sharove v. Middleman. (1956) 146 Cal.App.2d 199. 201-202. 
22 the Court made it clear that a foreign court has the jurisdiction to determine 
23 matters of child support if "the Court obtains personal jurisdiction over the paying 
24 spouse and that THE STATE is the state of the Child's domicile, residence or 
25 presence." 
26 As a matter of fact: 
27 16. The Plaintiff has appeared before the Utah Court on numerous 
28 I occasions as both the moving and responding party. As a result of one such 
15 
1 appearance, on July 14,1983, (In response to Respondent's motion to modify 
2 support) the Fourth Judicial District Court, of Utah County, Provo, Utah made a 
3 support order which has continued in full force and effect until the present time. 
4 17. In addition, in the recent case of Daves V. Daves. (1985) 173 CA 3d 
5 9JL the parties obtained their divorce decree in the State of Oklahoma. Shortly 
6 thereafter, mother moved to the State of California and both parties entered into a 
7 written stipulation to establish the Oklahoma Decree in California. Husband later 
8 filed an action in Oklahoma which was subsequently dismissed on the grounds 
9 that husband had submitted himself to the jurisdiction of California when he 
10 executed the Stipulation to establish the Oklahoma Decree in California. 
n " . . . Benjamin entered into a stipulation in which he asked that the 
12 Oklahoma judgment of divorce be entered as a California judgment and 
13 that the judgment be modified as to its visitation provisions" id. 106. 
14 The Plaintiff in the current matter falls under this directive when he 
15 registered the California Dissolution Order in the state of Utah, as a Utah Order 
16 requesting Utah be the venue of jurisdiction. 
17 18. Historically, both the Plaintiff and the Respondent entered into a 
18 number of stipulations in the Utah court. The Plaintiff also appeared in Utah to 
19 have his deposition taken. The Utah Courts have repeatedly asserted personal 
20 jurisdiction over support and over the Plaintiff himself, who is domiciled in 
21 California but who has willingly submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the State of 
22 Utah. Since the three of the Support orders pertains to "family" support a reading 
23 of Utah Civil Code Section 5152 is necessary: 
24 (1) A Court of this state which is competent to decide child custody 
25 matters has jurisdiction to make a child custody determination by 
26 initial or modification decree if the conditions as set forth in any of 
27 the following paragraphs are met: 
28 (a) This state (i) is the home state of the child at the time 
16 
of commencement of the proceeding, or (ii) had been 
the child's home state within six months before 
commencement of the proceedings and the child is 
absent from this state because of his removal or 
retention by a person claiming his custody or for other 
reasons, and a parent or person acting as parent 
continues to live in this state. 
(b) It is the best interest of the child that a court of this 
state assume jurisdiction because (i) the child and his 
parents, or the child and at least one contestant, have a 
significant connection with this state, and (ii) there is 
available in this state substantial evidence concerning 
the child's present or future care, protection, training, 
and personal relationships. 
(c) The child is physically present in this state and (i) the 
child has been abandoned or (ii) it is necessary in an 
emergency to protect the child because he has been 
subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse or 
is otherwise neglected or dependent. 
(d) (i) it appears that no other state would have 
jurisdiction under prerequisites substantially in 
accordance with (a) (b) (c), or another state has 
declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that this 
state is the more appropriate forum to determine the 
custody of the child, and (ii) it is in the best interest of 
the child that this court assume jurisdiction. 
19. Since the children of the marriage have resided continuously in the 
17 
i State of Utah since 1978 up to their year of majority when they left their home to 
2 attend school or work, being emancipated at the age of 18, and where there was 
3 substantial evidence concerning their welfare, protection, training, and personal 
4 relationships, and the fact that the Plaintiff supplied their financial needs while the 
5 children were living in Utah, by analogy, the California Court did not have the 
6 requisite jurisdiction of the matters which have been identified. And since the 
7 Respondent has lived in Utah for the past 27 years and at the same address, and 
8 since the Utah courts have taken jurisdiction over alimony, it stands to reason that 
9 jurisdiction of support should continue in the same manner today, as it has been 
10 in the past. 
11 In the case of Jaqqer v. Superior Court, (1979) 96 CA 3d 579 the Court 
12 declared, in pertinent part, 
13 Even if jurisdiction exists in California, it may be 
14 inappropriate to exercise it here when another state also 
15 has jurisdiction and is ready to exercise it, and when the 
16 Plaintiff is willing to litigate elsewhere; a stay is the more 
17 common remedy." 
18 Another case of equal importance is Hafer v. Superior Court, (1981) 126 
19 Cal.App.3d 856. The Original Dissolution was made in San Diego Superior Court 
20 . The Court awarded custody of the minor children to the father. 
21 Thereafter, the father moved with the minor children to the state of Idaho, where 
22 they lived except for a brief period when the mother fled with the children and 
23 took them to Florida. Mother then filed a modification action in the San Diego 
24 Superior Court. At the time, the children were living with their mother in San 
25 Diego. The San Diego Court assumed jurisdiction on the ground that since the 
26 Court had rendered the original custody Decree, it retained continuing jurisdiction 
27 to. modify provided that there was no pending proceeding in the State of Idaho. 
28 
18 
1 Father, on the other hand, argued that the California Court lacked modification of 
2 jurisdiction under UCCJA precisely because California was no longer the 
3 children's home state and they had no substantial contacts with California. 
4 (emphasis) He also argued the fact that the San Diego Court who had made the 
5 ohginal Decree was not a basis for jurisdiction in the modification action. In 
6 granting a writ of prohibition to prevent further proceedings in California, the 
7 Court of Appeals agreed that there was no basis for iurisdiction in California since 
8 Idaho was now the Children's home state, (emphasis) The court also stated that 
9 under UCCJA, the intent of the legislation was to prevent bringing modification 
10 procedures and unsuitable forums without making a bonafide attempt to invoke 
11 the jurisdiction of the correct court. Hafer. Id. at 662. The Court went on to 
12 declare. 
13 The normal preferences for adjudicating custody 
14 disputes in the home state where the children live, 
15 where the most evidence of their daily living conditions 
16 will be found, where the continuity and stability of their 
17 parental relationships and their daily routines will be 
18 least disrupted by the legal procedure. This case shows 
19 a prime example of the kind of disruption the act was 
20 intended to prevent. Id at 865 
21 20. The present case is a classical example of what the Plaintiff is 
22 attempting to do to the Respondent. Any one of the above scenarios could and 
23 should apply to the present case. 
24 In the case of Schlumpf v Superior Court. (1978) 79 
25 Cal.App.3d 892 where similar circumstances occurred is another case of 
26 similarity. California was the original state of dissolution. The father and the 
27 children moved to Wyoming. 9 years later the mother sought a modification of 
28 I custody in the California Court. The trial Court found that the California Courts 
19 
retained jurisdiction. Later the father filed a Writ of Mandate arguing that 
Wyoming was the most convenient forum. The Court of Appeals found California 
and Wyoming had concurrent jurisdiction. However, since the Children lived in 
Wyoming the court ruled that Wyoming had a closer connection with the Children 
and was the proper forum for litigating in the best interests of the children. 
21. And finally both legal Counsels for Plaintiff and Respondent signed a 
Stipulation agreeing to Utah jurisdiction and obeying the Utah Court orders with 
the permission of both parties ( Citel87-88) p.4, lines 3, 4, and 5. See also same 
Document p.4 (c) Where the Support payments are frozen! 
. . . On each and every occasion described herein, Petitioner appeared in 
the State of Utah and submitted himself to the jurisdiction in the State of 
Utah for the purpose of allowing that State to modify support orders 
regarding both the Respondent and the minor children in her care and 
custody..( Cite 911-915 ) lines 1-5. 
Utah agencies declare the validity of Utah Jurisdiction. 
22. In 1992 The Attorney General of Utah wrote a letter to the Riverside, 
California ORS stipulating that Utah does have jurisdiction. ( Cite 1080,81 ) The 
Utah AG cited the circumstances and filings by the Plaintiff in the Utah courts. 
In 1996, the Utah ORS sent the ORS in California a stipulation verifying 
that the Custodial parent, the Respondent was in need of arrears owed her. 
23. California Courts stays Plaintiffs California motions in favor of 
Utah jurisdiction 
Superior Court of Orange County 
With respect to the scenario where Respondent Mrs. Lundahl, is 
going to return to the State of Utah* the Court finds that if she does in 
fact return to the State of Utah with the minor children that there is no 
change in circumstances and prior custody orders issued and filed 
on August 24, 1987 [Utah] shall remain in full force and effect. 
20 
1 Los Angeles County, Norwalk Court: (Cite pp 996-97 ) Hosp dec!. 
2 All of Dr. Lundahl's actions for modification of the child custody case 
3 have been stayed. Dr Lundahl has 60 days in which to file a motion 
4 for modification in the Utah District Court; during that 60 day period 
5 you are awarded custody of the minor child Christian . . . . 
6 See also Respondent's Affidavit 
7 Note Respondent's Utah Activity summary of divorce matters 
8 in Utah as well as California (Addendum)*3 concurrently (attached) 
9 24. At the time of the Plaintiff's deposition his legal counsel was Sandra 
10 Rhodes. Note statements: (Cite, Schedule of exhibits 998,999-#9 p.24) 
n Miss Rhodes: In case you're interested, there's also an URESA action pending 
12 in Riverside all involving Mahene, as we say, a //'tf/e forum shopping to see how 
13 \we cat) do in which jurisdiction. I think. Im not involved in that, but I know it is 
14 pending. If the Court will peruse the entire deposition the Court will discover the 
15 Plaintiff's strategy of eternally filing motions in his relentless efforts to frustrate 
16 and exploit the courts as well as the Respondent.. 
17 25. The Plaintiff is clearly " guilty" of "shopping" other forums. In August 
18 of 1983 he filed a motion in the Superior Court of Los Angles, Norwalk Division. 
19 The Plaintiff was represented by Barry Wishart, in his petition for custody of the 
20 minor children. However as early as July 6.1983 the Plaintiff initiated custody 
21 modification proceedings in Utah. The matter was originally scheduled to be 
22 heard on July 14.1983. and the court made certain orders with respect to an 
23 increase in child support payments and a modification of visitation rights. 
24 However, the court did not rule on the custody modification, but continued that 
25 aspect of the proceeding until August 15.1983. On July 16.1983. but two 
26 I days after the hearing in the Utah matter, the Plaintiff filed an order to show 
27 
28 I 3 Find enclosed 
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1 cause for modification of child custody in the California jurisdiction. It was brought 
2 to the attention of the California Court and eventually the Court permanently 
3 stayed the proceeding since the same action was pending in the state of Utah. 
4 a) Declaration of Hosp re the California Courts decision to stay the 
5 proceedings in California pending the outcome of the Utah Court's 
6 decisions. Petitioner ordered to return minor children to Respondent 
7 c Minute entry, Utah, Custody of children denied Dr. Lundahl; (Cite 131,32) 
8 (See Utah minute entry, and Affidavit, Respondent ( Cite 96-98) 
9 26) In 1987 the Plaintiff filed a declaration with the California court 
10 stipulating to Utah as the venue of jurisdiction and the Plaintiff's willingness to 
n have the Respondent collect from his Corporation as well as from him personally, 
12 on support orders . (Cite 310 ) California Stipulation of Plaintiff's liability both 
13 personally and corporately 
14 27. While the support issues were being heard in Utah, (1993, 
15 1994,1995) The Plaintiff filed another OSC dated January 15.1993 before the 
16 Riverside County Court in an attempt to modify the Utah family support order. 
17 The Plaintiff failed in his effort as the court ruled the Plaintiff would have to return 
18 to Utah to modify the family support order since Utah had jurisdiction over the 
19 matter. Again on February 22.1993, one month after the hearing in 
20 Riverside, (Cite. California Deposition extracts 999; p. 2 / lines 1-3)*4 The 
21 Plaintiff filed another OSC in the Orange County Superior Court with Counsel 
22 Sandra Rhodes representing him. The issue was custody of the minor child 
23 Kwinci. At the time that this motion was filed the Plaintiff was in contempt of a 
24 Utah Court order mandating he place a $500 bond in the event he initiated 
25 removing a minor child beyond the state lines without notice to the 
26 Respondent. Essentially that is exactly what the Plaintiff did when he arranged for 
27 
28 I 4 Find enclosed 
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1 Kwinci to fly to California without the Respondent having any knowledge of where 
2 her daughter was. (Cite 179 ) Utah order $500 p.2. item 3. See above where 
3 California court permanently stays Plaintiff's motion for custody of children stating 
4 that Utah had "continuing jurisdiction" regarding the custody of the minor children 
5 of the Plaintiff and the Respondent. 
6 28) On July 8.1994. the Plaintiff filed another motion in the Orange County 
7 Superior court with the purpose of terminating child support & asking for attorney 
8 fees. The matter was heard on August 8,1994. The Plaintiff filed still another 
9 motion on December 27.1994 in the Civil Court in the Superior Court of Orange 
10 County charging the Respondent with breach of contract, common counts 
n (money received and owed back—$100,000 ) and fraud. Kent Tibbetts, the 
12 Respondents California Counsel filed a motion for Judgment on the Pleadings; 
13 Points and Authorities with Request for Judicial Notice. Mr. Tibbetts also filed an 
14 answer & counter-claim. The motion was granted and the case dismissed. 
15 29 This is a total of seven different petitions initiated by the Plaintiff in a 
16 period of two years if the Utah petition is included. It is important the court 
17 remember that any motions filed in California was in direct conflict to the authority 
18 of the Utah courts and the statutes of URESA's position on jurisdiction. It is the 
19 Respondent's opinion that this is a clear indication of "harassment" by the Plaintiff 
20 in order to frustrate her -purposefully using the California courts to serve his 
21 own purpose's hoping to win by" attrition" alone. 
22 I 
23 I PLAINTIFF'S LACK OF RESPECT FOR THE JUDICIAL SYSTEMS OF 
24 | BOTH UTAH AND CALIFORNIA JURISDICTIONS. 
25 
26 I 30.lt is indeed unfortunate that the Plaintiff feels such contempt for justice 
27 and the rule of Law that he "attempts" to manipulate the court system bending 
28 I when he can the infrastructure of the very system that protects our society and 
23 
guarantees it's citizens individual freedoms, without any regard to the 
consequences of those he hurts. 
31. Notice the dichotomy the plaintiff explores in his California deposition 
taken in California by his second wife, Ruth Carlson Lundahl. ( Cite Deposition p 
25, lines 1-5). It's in this moment of transparency that he claim's that Custody 
jurisdiction is in California and support issues are in the Utah jurisdiction. Since 
there are no longer children at home, this leaves the investigator with the 
impression by the Plaintiff' own admission that support issues are to be 
litigated in Utah. In the same deposition, the Plaintiff's arrogance surfaces once 
again (Cite Deposition p .22-23 ) 
Q: Are you under an order to pay Spousal Support to Marlene? 
A Yes. 
Q. How much are you ordered to pay her on a monthly basis? 
A: I'm not sure. I have a Utah order, I have a California Order and I'm 
not following either. (Dep p.23 lines 4-5). 
(Cite Deposition Extracts, Petitioner See p. 25, lines 1-5) 
Q . . . "Do you have an action pending to modify the California 
order? 
A. "No, I have an action in Utah. Riverside essentially looked at the 
thing all in all and said go back to Utah; that's where this thing belongs. So 
right now we have split jurisdiction; custody jurisdiction is in California and 
Alimony jurisdiction is in Utah." 
33.lt was only a few months ago that the Respondent's Utah Counsel, 
Michael Esplin, called the Respondent requesting that she come into his office. 
He angrily slapped his desk with some documents. He had been served with a 
Summons by the Plaintiff. The PLAINTIFF had filed in the United State District 
Court, Central District of California, Santa Ana Division. ( Cite 1065-1066 ) 
24 
motions citing does 1-though 20 accusing certain parties of fraud, conspiracy, 
racketeering & corruption. Along with the Respondent, the Plaintiff listed three 
Utah attorneys, Esplin, Petty, and Fugal and their respective law offices which 
have successfully represented the Respondent. Also included in the Plaintiff's 
"black" list were four judges of the Fourth District Court of Utah County, Utah, 
who have ruled favorably in regards to the divorce issues regarding the 
Respondent. Included in the list is the Honorable Judges, Howard Maetani. Guv 
Burninqham, Donald Evre .and Lynn Davis.. The plaintiff in this action cites Utah 
Constables Anthony Ferlund.and Ron Lyons as defendants also. In addition the 
Federal Judge Honorable Glen Clark, of Salt Lake City, Utah, Julia Montgomery 
Deputy District Attorney .Orange County District Attorneys Office. Santa Ana 
California, Office of Child Support; Commissioner Julee Robinson of the Orange 
County Superior Court, and Mary Dahlberq deputy Attorney General all named as 
defendants. The Plaintiff is clearly out of control causing the Respondent undue 
stress and emotional trauma. It seems that the Plaintiff, Gerald D. Lundahl sues 
anyone that opposes him in litigation or any judge that rules against him in a court 
room. The Respondent's Utah attorney, Michael Esplin called the Plaintiff's Utah 
Counsel, Richard Drake, asking what the reason was for all the law-suits the 
Plaintiff was filing. Mr. Drake responded by telling Mr. Esplin that he couldn't get 
in touch with the Plaintiff because he was enjoying a long Holiday in Paris, 
France. To date the Respondent has yet to be served; however nearly everyone 
else in the state of Utah named in the Pleadings have been served. (See (a) 
Affidavit filed by Respondent's Counsel and (b) decision of the Federal Court in 
California; (c) letter from Utah Counsel Esplin to Plaintiff's Utah Counsel David 
Drake (Cite court documents Appeals file) 
34.The Plaintiff has the propensity to go as far as he can in "bragging" 
about the things he -"gets away with-concerning the courts. A further review of 
25 
the 1993 Deposition clarifies this statement 
2 
3 THE PLAINTIFF WITH DELIBERATE CUNNING HAS MADE FALSE 
4 STATEMENTS, WITHHELD EVIDENCE, AND CONSTRUCTED FALSE 
5 DOCUMENTS IN ORDER TO PUT HIMSELF IN A FAVORABLE LIGHT 
6 BEFORE THE COURT 
7 . 
8 35. In 1993-94 when the Plaintiff appeared before the Fourth District Court 
9 in Utah he made false statements in his Utah deposition regarding his M.D.Diet 
10 Centers. The various issues addressed were: 
n a) Plaintiffs Purchase of a diet Center in Moreno Valley California 
12 (1994) $47,500 while claiming his only income was $1570 per month. 
13 b Diet Centers registered in the State of Nevada under Imperial 
14 Products with Plaintiff's 5th wife Mary Ann Hadley, Sec/treasurer. President: 
15 Robert Rohrbock, (who through affidavit claims he has met the Plaintiff only once, 
16 denying he was ever involved in a business venture with Plaintiff). 
n c) Construction of a stipulation under the direction of the Plaintiff 
18 through his Utah Counsel Dana Burroughs claims Plaintiff's only income is 
19 $1,570 per month. (See attached) 
20 d) The Marketing of M.D. Diet. Ownership of M.D. Diet Centers by 
21 Plaintiff is a published fact; 
22 e) Claim by Plaintiff that he had sold the diet centers to a "man" 
23 named L.G. Hinds, who turned out was Plaintiffs 3rd or 4th wife.Lucille Gerokas 
24 Hinds. Evidence of Marriage Licence: "false"bulk sale to L.G. Hinds (Plaintiff's 
25 wife) 
26 g) Plaintiff's affidavit submitted to Utah Court for lying. (Cite 383) 
27 h) Respondent's Utah legal Counsel's affidavits and memorandum to 
28 strike Plaintiff's pleadings concerning above facts: (Cite 384, 388,397, 418 ). 
26 
1 successful. 
2 i) Utah Court Sanctions Plaintiff for dishonesty and false claims Cite 
3 383) 
4 k) Plaintiffs non-registering of any diet entities in any agencies in the 
5 state of California 
6 I) Deception by Plaintiff revealing he made hundreds of thousand of 
7 dollars in 1993-1994 in direct contradiction of financial declarations filed with the 
8 court and Plaintiff's testimony of financial status to Utah court and the information 
9 submitted in the Plaintiff's Stipulation which the Respondent refused to sign 
10 URESSA not UIFSA controls the arrearage of support monies 
11 owed by Plaintiff 
12 36. The California Court had ratified UIFSA (Uniform Interstate Family 
13 Support Act) on January 1, 1998, therefore the 1994 California Order was still 
14 under the auspices of URESA. . . .meaning that one order does not nullify another 
15 order from another state. 
16 37. It is the understanding of the Respondent that the Plaintiff would have 
17 had to return to Utah to modify any Utah support order since the Utah Court was 
18 the last venue to rule, and a court order issued by this state is not nullified by an 
19 order from another state, nor can this state nullify an order from another state. A 
20 "void 1994 Order" has since been superceded by the current order of the 
21 California Court in 2002. 
22 38) It should be noted that the Plaintiff successfully attempted to deceive 
23 and confuse the court by unilaterally stating 
24 . . . a Judgment determining property and support issues was 
25 entered in California September 14, 1977. Thereafter, spousal 
26 support was modified by the California Court in 1987 at the 
27 [Respondent's] request... 
28 I This entire statement is flawed and incorrect. The Plaintiff took advantage of the 
27 
1 court in his pleadings giving the impression to the California court that 1987 was 
2 the second time that the parties were in court since the 1977 dissolution order. 
3 The Plaintiff failed to disclose to the California Court that in the interim of 
4 the years 1978 through 1994 98% of all issues regarding divorce and support 
5 issues were litigated in the state of Utah. ( Cite Utah Docket 882) 
6 39.Later Information surfaced which proved that the Plaintiff had not told 
7 the truth in his deposition and had given false testimony before the Utah Court. 
8 After the Plaintiff admitted lying to the Utah court through affidavit, the Court 
9 sanctioned the Plaintiff for lying and dishonesty and ordered him to place in a 
10 trust fund $3000 for the purpose of depositions on the parties involved with the 
n M.D,. Diet business located in the state of California, which the Plaintiff owns. 
12 (The Respondent's Utah Counsel, Mr. Michael Esplin, was expected to go to 
13 California for the purpose of taking depositions.) However the Plaintiff ignored the 
14 court's order and received a contempt citation. 
15 40) The incorporated findings of the Utah court were that Utah had 
16 continuing jurisdiction of the parties; that the Plaintiff had failed to obey court 
17 orders, had given admittedly false testimony at his deposition and had failed to 
18 purge himself of the court's contempt order. ( Cite pp 384,388,397) The 
19 Respondent cites evidence of jurisdiction by the Utah Court activity attached to 
20 this pleading (See Utah Docket, Utah Court of Appeal). 
21 The Plaintiff defied the subsequent rulings of the Utah Court and fled 
22 to California to file another OSC on July 8, 1994 in the Orange County venue 
23 addressing the same issues. 
24 DOCTRINE OF LACHES 
25 41 . Currently, in the California Courts the Plaintiff claimed the Doctrine of 
26 Laches in support of his attempt to avoid honoring the Utah Orders. However, 
27 not only has the Respondent in this matter attempted through litigating on 
28 numerous occasions but through correspondence was denied assistance by the 
28 
i Utah Office of Recovery in her attempt to get satisfaction regarding the 
2 registration and collection of orders .Under normal circumstances the Office of 
3 Recovery in Utah must process court orders through the Office of Recovery in 
4 the jurisdiction of the Obligor. However, the Department of Health and Human 
5 Services in Utah would not avail the Respondent of their office claiming that it 
6 was against the policy of the Utah agency. At the same time the Utah Human 
7 Services Office which is the tribunal for the collecting of support orders suggested 
8 that the Respondent appeal to the California Agencies. 
9 42. With this suggestion and with Extracts from the Handbook on Child 
10 Support Enforcement distributed by the Department of Health and Human 
11 Resources, Washington, D.C. the respondent appealed to the Attorney General 
12 of the state of California. The Attorney General of California sent instructions to 
13 the Orange County District Attorney's office to begin collection on the Utah 
14 orders. Any authorized agency mandated to collect on family support matters is 
15 supported by California Codes of Civil procedure. 
16 Respondent's List of written communication to local, regional and 
17 federal agencies 
18 1) Department of Recovery Services, 1996. 
19 2) Letter from Judge David Gray to Orrin Hatch, 1996 
20 3) Department of Social Services, Sacramento, Calif. June 1996 
21 4) Administration for Children & Families, San Francisco, CA Sept 
22 27, 1996 
23 5) Department of Health & Human Services (also Riverside ORS) 
24 Feb., 10, 1997 
25 6) Department of Social Services; Sacramento, CA May 7, 1997 
26 7) Director, Department of Human Services. 1997 
27 8) Department of Health & Human Services, Washington D.C. April, 
28 I 27, 1998 
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1 9) Department of Health & Human Services, Washington D.C. Aug 8, 
2 1997 
3 10) Department of Health & Human Services, Washington D.C. 
4 April, 27, 1998 
5 11) Administration for Children & Families, Washington, D.C. April 
6 27, 1988 
7 12) Regional Depart of Human Services, (Denver) Co, September 26, 
8 13) Director, Department of Human Services, Utah, 2001 
9 These letters are but a reflection of the efforts made by the Respondent to 
10 register and collect on arrearage owed by the Plaintiff (Appellee) As a result of 
11 this activity The Respondent alleged any attempt by the Plaintiff to vacate the 
12 Utah Orders should be dismissed. All attempts by the Respondent during the 
13 years of 1996 through 2001 was made in a timely manner. The Orange County 
14 District Attorney's Office became involved being the tribunal to collect on Utah 
15 orders. Fortunately they too filed motions against the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff's 
16 attempts failed. 
17 43.The battle continues. The Plaintiff filed additional motions. An Active 
18 motion was submitted by the Orange County District Attorney's Office acting as 
19 Intervenor. Jurisdiction vs. Jurisdiction 
20 Utah Attorney General on Utah jurisdiction. (Cite 1081-2) 
21 Plaintiff Designation of Record on Appeal to Utah Supreme Court )Cite 
22 134-136) 
23 Utah Stipulation (Counsels for Plaintiff and Respondent.^ Cite 10,114) 
24 Lundahl Dissolution: Letter from California Counsel Hosp for Respondent 
25 California action staved (Cite 996,7 ) 
26 Utah Minute Entries, August 15, 1983: (Cite 131 ) 
27 Affidavit of Respondent: Chronology of California and Utah Actions:; (Cite 
28 p 2, this pleading) 
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1 Plaintiff's verification to Riverside Family Support by deposition that Utah 
2 has Jurisdiction. ( Cite 911 -915 Schedule of Exhibits Cite 998,999) 
3 Plaintiff's admission of "forum" shopping. (Cite #9, Schedule of Exhibits 
4 Cite 998-999 ) 
5 Plaintiff's Constant filing of motions Cite p.8,9,10 this pleading) 
6 
7 44. Another document which verifies that the Plaintiff was fully aware of the 
8 $29,200 order (which he alleges he knew nothing about) occurred when he and 
9 his attorney Dana Burroughs constructed a stipulation which the Plaintiff wanted 
10 the Respondent to sign, on the premise that he only made $1570.00 per month. 
n The Stipulation was faxed to the Respondent's counsel Mr. Esplin. ( attached) 
12 The Respondent had found evidence that the Plaintiff was not telling the 
13 truth and refused to sign it. Obviously the Plaintiff was earning more than $1570 
14 per month. The Plaintiff's American Express card account, which the Respondent 
15 has in her possession shows a dramatic excess of what he claimed he made, 
16 averaging in the neighborhood of $8000 per month charged on his American 
n Express Credit Card. Nevertheless, on page 3, item 12 the $2900,200 is 
18 mentioned which again proves the Plaintiff was aware of this order: ( see 
19 attachment) 
20 . . . presently has a judgment against the Plaintiff in the amount of 
21 $29,200 as entered by the Court on March 10, 1 9 9 3 , . . . As 
22 satisfaction for that judgment, the Lundahl Trust shall pay to 
23 Defendant a lump sum of $5,000 . . . 
24 SUMMARY OF FALSEHOODS BY PLAINTIFF 
25 
26 1) Proof of service to Plaintiff by California Marshall 
27 2) Plaintiff's Contempt of Utah Court 
28 3) Plaintiff's affidavit of lying to Utah Court 
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1 4) Defendants successful Utah motions against Plaintiff 
2 5) Plaintiff's Falsely constructed bulk sale of M.D. Diet to L.G. Hinds, who 
3 the Plaintiff said was a man, but in actuality was Lucille Gerakos Hinds the 
4 Plaintiff's third or (?) fourth wife. 
5 45. The Orange County District Attorney's Office registered the orders 
6 (April, 1999, April 1995, March 1993, August 1991, and April 1991) as mandated 
7 by the California Attorney Generals's Office after considerable deliberation and 
8 following Federal Statues under the Enforcement of Child Support, along with the 
9 support of UIFSA, Uniform Interstate Family Support Act. California ratified this 
10 Act in January 1998 and Utah in 1996. Until that Act was ratified the support 
11 orders were submitted and collected under the authority of URESA. 
12 46. The Respondent asserts that any California continuing jurisdiction 
13 arising from the dissolution terminated when both parties willingly litigated the 
14 issue of family and spousal support as well as custody matters in the State of 
15 Utah. Both parties have litigated in the Utah jurisdiction since 1978, with the 
16 exception of a temporary stay in California where the Respondent located while 
17 her daughter trained for tennis. Even then, she claimed Utah as her residence 
18 and paid taxes there. 
19 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITY. 
20 (Quoted dialogue by the California Deputy Attorney General on Utah jurisdiction) 
21 Since the California Court in 2002 declined to establish the arrears, 
22 reserving the issue for later hearing, the order was interlocutory (Cowan v. 
23 Moreno, supra 903 S.W. 2d at p. 121) Id at p. 124 under UIFSA). The Court went 
24 on to hold that under UIFSA, the petition to register raises the issue of 
25 enforcement of arrearges. (/.d.at p 123) furthermore, since the order to be 
26 registered was valid on its face, it could only be attacked on specific grounds 
27 such as lack of personal jurisdiction or some procedural defect that would render 
28 the decree void. (Ibid). "There is no defense. . . to the registration of foreign 
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1 support orders.' (UIFSA section 606. Comment 9. U.L.A. 126. 160 (supp. 1994V" 
2 Ibid. However, there is no jurisdiction to appeal an interlocutory order (ibid.) The 
3 court held that Cowan's pleading challenged the amount of the arrears, which 
4 relates to enforcebility rather than to the existence of the support order. (Id. at pp 
5 123-124) Since the trial court expressly declined to establish the arrears, 
6 reserving the issue for a later hearing the order was interlocutory. The Order on 
7 appeal denied the Plaintiff's request to vacate the registration, but specifically 
8 continued the issue of the amount of arrears owed. The issue of arrears was later 
9 taken off calendar until the California Appeal is concluded. This is thus an 
10 interlocutory order and the appeal should be dismissed. 
11 The Plaintiff argues that this case is appealable because the Utah orders, 
12 having been registered in California, are immediately enforceable. (Plaintiff's 
13 California Letter Brief p.2.) He looks for support of his contention in the holding 
14 from In re Marriage of Adams (1987) 188 Ca:.App.3d 863 which stated that "Such 
15 postjudgment order, which relates to enforcement of the judgment, is appealable. 
16 [Citation] (id. at p 688.) However, "such postjudgment order" in that case related 
17 specifically to a postjudgment order granting or denying motions under former 
18 Civil Code section 5124, which related to community property settlements and 
19 military retirements within certain time limits (id. at p. 686, fn 3) Nevertheless, a 
20 judgment must fully dispose of the litigated matter, i.e., there must be a final 
21 determination of the partes ' rights, before an appellate court will entertain an 
22 appeal (In re Marrriage of Griffin (1993) 15 Cal.App. 4th 685.689). 
23 This order does not fully dispose of the issues before the court because the 
24 Plaintiffs arrearage obligation was continued to a future date, since taken off 
25 calendar due to the California appeal. 
26 The Utah Child and Spousal support orders became enforceable 
27 immediately upon registration. The Plaintiffs petition for writ of supercedeas was 
28 denied. The appeal court has jurisdiction to deem the appeal to be a petition for 
33 
1 writ of prohibition (Olsen v. Cory (1983) 35Cal.3d 390, 400.) 
2 EFFECT OF THE 1991 AND 1995 UTAH ORDERS ON THE 1977 
3 CALIFORNIA DISSOLUTION ORDER 
4 "The California Department of Child Support enforcement adopts the 
5 argument that the Utah orders did not modify the California Orders, they were 
6 independent orders running concurrently-and adds the following:" 
7 Under URESA, child and spousal support were treated identically. 
8 (Sampson, Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (1996) fAM.I.q. Summer 1998, 
9 Prefactorv Note, at 403). It is a well-settled law that the responding state in a 
10 URESA action could not modify a support order from another state without clearly 
11 stating that the new judgment modified the previous judgment and only then with 
12 proper notice and opportunity to be heard. (See former Fam.Code. Section 4840 
13 (repealed by stats. 1997, ch 194 Section 1). In re Marraige of Ward (1994) 299 
14 Cla.App.4th 1452, 1456-1457; In re Marriage of Popenhager (1979) 99 
15 Cal.App.3d 514, 521-522.) Instead the responding state entered a denovo order. 
16 (Kathleen A. Burdette, Making Parents Pay: Interstate Child Enforcement after 
17 United States v. Lopez (Apr 1996) 144 U. Pa. L Rev. 1469. 1484) The two 
18 judgments ran concurrently and payments to one were credited against the 
19 other. (Former Fam. Code Section 4840). If an obligor chose to pay on the lower 
20 order, arrears would accrue under the higher order to account for the difference. 
21 This is what is happening in the present case. 
22 Kammersell. Vs Kammersell (Utah 1990) 792 P.2d 496 is in accord with 
23 this reasoning. In Kammersell, a Pennsylvania court, responding to a request 
24 from Utah to enforce a Utah order, entered a lower support amount. (Kammersell, 
25 Supra, 792 P.2d at p. 496-497). The Utah Court held that Pennsylvania had not 
26 modified the Utah order because it did not specifically provide that it was a 
27 modification as required by URESA. (Id. at p. 498-499). Since it was the Utah 
28 order that was higher, the court was not required to review the validity of the 
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1 Pennsylvania order—arrears had accrued under the higher order (id.at 498) 
2 The Plaintiff's reliance on Rimensburger v. Rinensburger (Utah 
3 Ct.App. 1992) 841 P.2d 709 is misplaced. That opinion was interpreting Utah's 
4 intrastate transfer of jurisdiction and found that, internally, one district court did 
5 not have jurisdiction to modify the orders of another district court. (Id. at p. 710) It 
6 did not address the issue of establishing a denovo order. The Court in 
7 Kammersall made the correct analysis of the effect of multiple support orders. 
8 That analysis is applicable to this case. Until the enactment of the Full Faith and 
9 Credit for Child Support Order Act (FCCOA. 28 U.S.C.A. 1738B) or the Uniform 
10 Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA), states were able to establish multiple child 
11 and spousal support orders. As Kammersall explains, a subsequent order did not 
12 "modify" a previous order. Kammersall v. Kammersall 792.P.2d 496. 498 (Utah) 
13 1990) 
14 The assertion by the Plaintiff that a subsequent order is "void and of no 
15 force and effect" is incorrect. (Plaintiff's California Letter Brief, pg 5). As the Utah 
16 Court stated: 
17 It is true that under these acts a responding state . . . 
18 may set a different amount that the 'obligor (Plaintiff) 
19 must pay, and in that sense there is a 'modification' of 
20 an amount, but we do not believe and do not hold that 
21 the decree of the 'initiating' state . . . was modified, 
22 vacated, reformed or eliminated Oglesby v. Ogesby, 
23 510 P.2d 1106. 1107(1973) 
24 This principle is applicable regardless of which order sets the highest 
25 amount of support. A subsequent order that sets a lower support amount has no 
26 mathematical effect on the aggregate arrears that may be owed. Conversely, a 
27 subsequent order that sets a higher support amount has the undeniable effect of 
28 being the order used to calculate the aggregate arrears. While the subsequent 
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1 lower order may have no effect on the calculations, it is still a valid order that is in 
2 force. If the support under the first order terminates earlier than the support under 
3 the second; obviously, the second order would have force and effect on the 
4 ongoing obligation and any arrears after the termination of the initial order. 
5 Again Reliance on Rmensburger v. Rimsburaer. 841, P.2d 709 (Utah 
6 Ct.App.1992) is completely misplaced since Utah has correctly held it is only 
7 applicable to subject matter jurisdiction between two courts. Banklerv. 
8 Bankler, 963 P.2d 797.800 (Utah Ct. App 1998). Citing Oglesby, the court in 
9 Bankler basically reaffirms the proposition that the ability to "modify" its initial 
10 order rests solely with the initial court. ( Id ) . The Bankler court was not presented 
n the issue whether a Utah court could enter a valid, independent, subsequent 
12 order in the context of there being another states's order. 
13 (Citing Amicus letter brief) One of the major differences between interstate 
14 and intrastate family law prior to UIFSA and FFCCSOA was the ability of one 
15 state to establish an order for prospective support when there was an existing 
16 order on the same issue in another state. Within many states, there was only one 
17 court with continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over its order. The court also had 
18 exclusive jurisdiction in the sense that no court in another state could modify or 
19 invalidate the order. However, there was no exclusivity over the support 
20 obligation. This multiplicity of valid obligations created the problem that UIFSA 
21 was designed to solve. 
22 The ability and practice of a subsequent court entering a valid child 
23 support order in a different amount dwindled as states began to adopt UIFSA. A 
24 state adopting UIFSA no longer had the ability to issue new, subsequent orders. 
25 The practice came to a complete halt with the enactment of FFCCSOA on 
26 October 20,1994. After that date, a state had to give full faith and credit to the 
27 child support order issued by another state. New orders are not permitted. Only 
28 "true modifications" can occur. As the practice of entering subsequent orders 
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1 ceases, there becomes only one tribunal with the exclusive jurisdiction to 
2 prospectively modify the support obligation. 
3 Recognizing that multiple, valid orders entitled to full faith and credit had 
4 been created, both FFCCSOA and UIFSA set up the same mechanism to 
5 determine which of the multiple orders would control the issue of prospective 
6 support. 28 U.S.C.A. 1738B (f) & Fam. Code 4911. FFCCOA only applies to 
7 child support orders. However, UIFSA as a matter of state law does apply to 
8 spousal support orders. (Fam. Code Section 4901 (r) and (u). It is premised on 
9 there being one tribunal with exclusive jurisdiction over all support (child or 
10 spouse) obligations. UIFSA provides for a very limited circumstance that will 
11 allow transfer of the exclusive jurisdiction to modify the child support obligation. 
12 The distinction between child support and spousal support is that once the first 
13 tribunal enters an order regarding the spousal support obligation, the obligation 
14 can only be modified by that tribunal. (Fam. Code Section 4909). This has 
15 already been discussed in amicus curiea; the fact that the determination of 
16 controlling order provisions of UIFSA do not apply to spousal support orders. 
17 Whether the Utah state court proceeding that resulted in support 
18 orders from that court were conducted pursuant to the Revised Uniform 
19 Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, the Utah Foreign Judgment Act, or 
20 another statute. 
21 The California Attorney General's Office would respond that the 
22 initial Utah spousal support order was an independent cause of action not 
23 conducted pursuant to either the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of 
24 Support Act (RURESA) or the Utah Foreign Judgment Act. 
25 The resolution of this issue is not dependent on the caption of the 
26 pleadings. Often, it is not dependent on the imprecise working of an order. As 
27 the court noted in Oglesby, and interstate "modification" is not really a 
28 I modification. Oglesby, supra at 1107. Of greater significance is the Utah court's 
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1 recitation in the 1991 "Order on Order to Show Cause" that the court issued its 
2 order pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 30-3-5 (3). Although this section has 
3 been revised since 1991, the substance remains the same. In pertinent part, it 
4 provided in 1991: "The court has continuing jurisdiction to make . . .new orders for 
5 the support and maintenance of the parties . . .as is reasonable and necessary." 
6 Utah Code Annotated 30-3-5(3) (revised.) 
7 Any contention by the Plaintiff that Utah can only establish spousal support 
8 in the context of a divorce is unavailable. The Utah Supreme Court confirmed that 
9 the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA) permitted Utah to 
10 establish an independent spousal support order. Lamberth v. Lamberth. 550 P.2d 
n 200, 202(1976) It is interesting to note that the court in Lamberth fell into the 
12 misnomer addressed by the same court in Oglesby and characterized the Utah 
13 action as a "reduction" of the support previously ordered. (Id.) The court 
14 obviously believed the subsequent Utah order was a valid order. 
15 The California Department of Child support would disagree with the 
16 Plaintiff that this action for a new spousal support amount was pursued under the 
17 Utah Foreign Judgments Act. (Appellants Letter Brief, pg 8, California) Bankler is 
18 correct: The Utah Foreign Judgment act does not confer jurisdiction on a Utah 
19 court to prospectively modify an order issued by a foreign state court . . . 
20 Bankler, supra at 800 (emphasis added) 
21 The Utah Foreign Judgments Act is similar to the Foreign Judgment Acts of 
22 most states. It is a legal construct for enforcing judgments. It is not to be used to 
23 establish prospective obligations. Its ability to even alter existing judgments is 
24 extremely limited. It is a method for collection of obligations that have been 
25 reduced to a judgment or have become judgments by operation of law. 
26 It is precisely because of the temporal limitations on actions under a 
27 Foreign Judgment Act that URESA and RURESA were utilized for family support. 
28 For cases with no orders, they provided a structure for a resident of one state to 
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1 obtain services in another state for the establishment of an order.URESA and 
2 RURESA also provided a legal construct for a tribunal in one state to issue a new 
3 support order for prospective support, when there was already an existing order 
4 in another state. The Plaintiff is correct that the orders in this case were not 
5 obtained using RURESA. One distinction is that private counsel was used 
6 instead of the Department of Human Services or the Title 1V-agency. However, 
7 the use of RURESA is not dispositive of the validity of the order. 
8 The version of RURESA used by Utah acknowledged:" The remedies 
9 herein provided are in addition to and not in substitution for any other remedies". 
10 Utah Code 77-31-3 (repealed). It further provided" "Support order' means any 
11 judgment, decree, or order of support , . . . regardless of the kind of action in 
12 which it is entered" and "Duty of Support' includes any duty of support imposed or 
13 impossable by law or by any court order, decree or judgment. . . whether 
14 incidental to a proceeding for divorce, legal separation, separate maintenance of 
15 otherwise." Utah Code Ann.77-31-2 (10) and Utah Code Ann. 77-31-2(6) (both 
16 repealed). Clearly, at the time the Utah court entered its orders, RURESA was 
17 not the exclusive means to obtain spousal support in Utah. As the Utah court 
18 noted, the duty of support in this case was impossable under Utah Code Ann. 30-
19 3-5(3) and was imposed by a court order in a proceeding for separate 
20 maintenance. 
21 Whether the September 22, 2003 Utah state court order has been 
22 appealed and if so, the effect of the pendency of that appeal on this 
23 proceeding. 
24 (Quoting from amicus curiae -letter brief:) amicus curiae can only 
25 hope that the 2003 Utah state rulings will ultimately be reviewed by a competent 
26 court. Not only is it incorrect in this case; but, it misconstrues the entire 
27 jurisprudence of Utah 
28 As previously discussed, to the extent of the Utah court "purporting" 
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1 to modify" the existing California order, it was not a true "modification". Thus, the 
2 first issue decided in the 2003 order is not factually correct. To be sustained, the 
3 decision would have to be re-characterized as a finding in 2003 that the same 
4 court did not have jurisdiction to enter its independent order in 1995. The fallacy 
5 of this has been discussed as well. The Utah court's holding that it is invalidating 
6 the April 13 1995 Order has the effect of reinstating the original 1991 order. If 
7 this ruling is correct the Plaintiff actually owes support higher on the 1991 rate. 
8 The ruling does nothing to invalidate the Judgment obtained in 1999. It should be 
9 noted that the arguments being made now were available in 1999 but were not 
10 raised either at the hearing that lead to the judgment nor in any appeal. 
11 (emphasis) The incorrectness of the ruling is also apparent since the 1995 order 
12 modified the 1991 Utah order, not any California Order.(Cite 1078,amicus brief) 
13 The second issue ruled upon by the 2003 Utah order is essentially the 
14 same as the first and the associated problems are the same as discussed above. 
15 Assuming the court's third ruling is upheld, it will resolve the issue first 
16 propounded - the determination of a prospectively controlling order. If Utah is 
17 now deferring exclusive jurisdiction over spousal support to California, then the 
18 prospective support will be what California determines. However, this ruling can 
19 only be prospective. 
20 Apparently, the Utah court was lead to believe that waiving the wand of 
21 UIFSA over the case would solve all the issues. Thus, the court decided to apply 
22 UIFSA retroactively unconditionally. The application is not that simple. The 
23 Plaintiff would have this court believe that the trend "is to use UIFSA to declare all 
24 subsequent orders entered using URESA, RURESA, or some other remedy are 
25 superfluous and void ab nitio. (Appellant's California Letter Brief, pg 9) citing 
26 State of Utah, Dept of Human Services v. Jacoby, 975 P.2d 939 (Utah 
27 Ct.App.1999) No state had gone that far. This interpretation of retroactivity would 
28 mean the section on determining the controlling order in a multiple order situation 
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1 is truly superfluous. (See Fam. Code Section 4913). If all subsequent orders are 
2 now void in Utah, actions for refunds when those orders were higher would soon 
3 abound. The holding does not make it clear if it applies to all subsequent orders 
4 from all sates that are now being enforced in Utah or it applies to all subsequent 
5 Utah orders regardless of where they are being enforced. It is obviously this last 
6 application that the Plaintiff is wanting to foist upon this court. Being stated 
7 without any restrictions, the ruling would apply to both child and spousal support 
8 orders. 
9 What Jacoby held is that the procedural aspects of UIFSA can be applied 
10 retroactively. (Id. at 942). This is the corollary to the "general rule followed in 
11 Utah" that the substantive law in effect at the time the action was initiated governs 
12 the action. Wilde v Wilde, 969 P.2d 438 (Utah Ct.App.1998). Surely the Plaintiff 
13 will not contend that retroactively invalidating all support orders that were valid at 
14 the time of entry is only "procedural", it is also doubtful that Utah intends this 
15 wholesale invalidation to be its jurisprudence. Under Utah law, the issue of 
16 whether a law operates retroactively is a question of law and no deference to the 
17 decision of a district court must be given. Jacoby, supra at 941. In addition, the 
18 issue of retroactivity of UIFSA is a lynchpin that the Plaintiff' uses in his argument 
19 in California that Utah lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter its orders. If the 
20 premise that UIFSA applies retroactively to invalidate all subsequent orders is 
21 found to be incorrect, then at the time of entry of the orders in this case, Utah law 
22 allowed subsequent spousal support orders to be established using either 
23 general family law provision or RURESA, so the orders entered by Utah are valid. 
24 Valid sister state judgments are entitled to full faith and credit meaning that the 
25 Plaintiff owes all missed payments of spousal support calculated using the 
26 highest order in existence at the time, (amicus curiae) 
27 It is the opinion of the California Attorney General's Office (Intervenor) that 
28 
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1 Utah could only issue independent spousal support orders. To this day, Utah can 
2 not enter an order that modifies, supercedes, or nullifies the spousal support 
3 provisions of any California orders. 
4 WERE THE UTAH PROCEEDINGS CONDUCTED PURSUANT TO 
5 URESA, UFJA, OR OTHER STATUTE? (Taken from Letter Brief submitted to 
6 California Court of Appeals) 
7 The California Attorney General's Office adopts the argument that the Utah 
8 spousal support order was not issued pursuant to URESA or UFJA. In this case, 
9 the action in Utah began as a civil complaint by the Plaintiff to enforce his 
10 visitation rights. The Utah court had jurisdiction to entertain an order for support in 
n such an action. (See e.g.., Utah Codes Annotated 1953 Section 30-3-3) [in any 
12 action to establish an order for parent-time, the court may order a party to provide 
13 support for the other party during the pendency of the action.]) 
14 THE SEPTEMBER 22, 2003, UTAH ORDER HAS BEEN APPEALED. 
15 Respondent, Ruth Telford (Lundahl) filed a notice of appeal with the 
16 Utah court Appeals on October 2, 2003. The California Department of Child 
17 Support Enforcement (Respondent Intervenor, California Deputy Attorney 
18 General) adopts and joins the argument regarding the errors of the 2003 Utah 
19 order. 
20 "The order in Utah appears to be in response to a motion to strike 
21 respondent'sorder to show cause filed by the Plainitff on March 4, 2003, while 
22 this (California) appeal was pending. (Motion for judicial Notice, Exhibit B p. 13. 
23 California Attorney Generals Office). The Order to show cause was issued on 
24 May 29, 2002, and the Plaintiff was served on June 22, 2002. (Id. at p. 11) These 
25 dates are significant when it is noted that the order on appeal in California was 
26 entered May 3, 2002, and notice of appeal in California was filed on July 2, 2002. 
27 Furthermore, at least part of the delay in hearing the order to show cause in Utah 
28 was because the Plaintiff filed a federal action, naming judges and attorneys in 
42 
1 Utah as defendants, which required recusal." 
2 (a former argument citing another issue on Utah jurisdiction) 
3 The doctrine of forum non conveniens is ancillary to the issue of 
4 jurisdiction It requires that jurisdiction exists in two different forums or states (Cf 
5 . In Re Marriage of Fox (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 862. 873 [225 CR 823]) This rule 
6 of law is codified in Code of Civil Procedure Section 410.30 which provides, in 
7 pertinent part: "When a court upon motion of a party or its own motion finds that in 
8 the interest of substantial justice an action should be heard in a forum outside this 
9 state, the court shall stay or dismiss the action in whole or in part on any 
10 conditions that may be just." "There must be jurisdiction over the defendant and 
l i the assurance that the action will not be barred by a statue of limitations. 
12 (Stanqvik. supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 752): (Shilev Inc. v Superior Court (1992) 4 
13 Cal.App.4th 126. 133 [6CR2 38|) Although the Defendant raised a question of 
14 jurisdiction in California, she pointed to the pendency of the same action in Utah 
15 (Cf. Atlantic Richfield Company v. Superior Court (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 168,176 
16 M24 CR63)- motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens held to include motion 
17 to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction arising from failure to include an indispensable 
18 party.) Consider: 
19 In a case in which the juvenile court's jurisdiction was not 
20 raised the California Court of Appeal indicated that if an 
21 objection based on forum non conveniens was not made in the 
22 trial court the issue was waived. (In re Christopher B. (1996) 
23 43 Cal.App.4th 551. 558-559 [51 CR2 43]) The appellate court 
24 distinguished a decision from the California Supreme Court in 
25 re Stephanie M.. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295 [27 CR2 595]) The 
26 Supreme Court had considered a forum non conveniens 
27 argument in that case noting that" . . . the Court of Appeal 
28 erred in assuming that without notice of a pending Mexican 
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i proceeding, the juvenile court was under no obligation to 
2 consider whether it was the appropriate forum." (In re 
3 Stephanie M.. supra. 7 Cal.4th 295. 312 [27 CR2 595]) 
4 In The Defendant's case the court was aware of the pending Utah litigation. 
5 
6 ARGUMENT AGAINST CALIFORNIA JURISDICTION 
7 
8 Subject matter jurisdiction can be attacked at any time, in addition to in 
9 personam jurisdiction and this does not constitute a general appearance. 
10 (Boisclair v. Superior Court. (1990)) 51 Cal.3d 1140. 1144. fn.1 [276 CR 621) 
l i A party may also make a hybrid motion to quash/dismiss, thereby 
12 challenging both subject matter and personal jurisdiction without making a 
13 general appearance. (Witkin. California Procedure. Jurisdiction, section 387. p. 
14 99JL 
15 The Respondent asserts that any California's continuing jurisdiction arising 
16 from the dissolution terminated when both parties willingly litigated the issue of 
17 family and spousal support as well as custody matters in the State of Utah. Both 
18 parties have litigated in the Utah jurisdiction since 1978. 
19 See Sollev v. Sollev (1964) 227 Cal.App.2d 522. 529 
20 [38 CR 802[) -both parties entered into a property 
21 settlement agreement in California, then invoked the 
22 jurisdiction of the State of Nevada for their divorce and 
23 incorporation of the property settlement agreement. 
24 When wife later filed suit in California for an accounting, 
25 the Court of Appeal determined that the Nevada decree 
26 was binding on the parties and California had no 
27 jurisdiction. 
28 See also (Cf. Leverett v. Superior Court (1963) Cal.App.2d 126 [34 CR 
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784] -continuing jurisdiction where wife registered Washington judgment in 
California then opposed California jurisdiction. 
The fairness question necessitates balancing the burden of 
inconvenience to the Defendant against the states interest in resolving the 
dispute. (Id. At pp. 97-101 [56 LEd.2d at pp 144-147]). It was not fair to force the 
Defendant to litigate the same matter in California that was pending in the State 
Court of Utah. (In Re Marriage of Aaron. Supra. 224 Cal. App.3d 1086. 1095 [274 
CR 357]) Subject matter jurisdiction refers to a court's authority, i.e., 
competency, to adjudicate the type of controversy involved. (Witkin. California 
Procedure. 4th ed.. Jurisdiction, section 6(c). p. 552]). The actions of a court 
without subject matter jurisdiction are void and may be set aside at any time. 
(Estate of Buck, supra.. 29 Cal.App.4th 1846. 1854 [35CR2 442]). 
If as contended California lacked subject matter jurisdiction there was no 
concurrent jurisdiction involved and Utah had exclusive jurisdiction. (see 
pp 14,15. this document. (Witkin. California Procedure. 4th ed.. Jurisdiction, 
section 427(1 ).p. 1042) 
Personal or in personam jurisdiction depends upon three factors: (A) 
Jurisdiction of the state. (B) Due process, i.e., notice and opportunity for hearing. 
(C) Compliance with statutory jurisdiction requirements of process (Witkin. 
California Procedure. Jurisdiction, section 80. pp. 45-451.) Jurisdiction is based 
on an underlying principle of "relationship to the state" which makes the exercise 
of jurisdiction "reasonable." (Witkin. California Procedure. Jurisdiction, section 82. 
p. 452.) The Defendant and the children of the marriage have been residents of 
the state of Utah since 1977. 
The state of California ratified the UIFSA Act in January of 1998. The Utah 
Court ratified the same Act in April of 1996. 
"URESA" IS THE CONTROLLING AUTHORITY IN THE MATTER OF 
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1 THE 1995 UTAH ORDER SINCE JURISDICTION OF ALL SUPPORT 
2 MATTERS REGARDING THE PLAINTIFF AND THE RESPONDENT WAS 
3 TAKEN BY THE UTAH COURTS. 
4 The Plaintiff historically submitted to the statutes of URESA honoring 
5 the Utah orders, which were registered by the District Attorneys Office of 
6 Riverside County in the state of California. According to [UIFSA] under the 
7 Chapter of Jurisdiction ( 78-45f-201) . . . "this state may exercise personal 
8 jurisdiction over a non-resident individual, iffjjtthe individual is personally served 
9 with notice within this state;||) the individual submits to the jurisdiction of this state 
10 by consent by entering a general appearance, or by filing a responsive document 
11 having the effect of waiving any contest to personal jurisdiction:... %) there is any 
12 other basis consistent with the constitutions of this state and the United States for 
13 \ the exercise of personal jurisdiction J j | ) The custodial parent and the children 
14 resided in the state of Utah. The Plaintiff has consistently fulfilled all of the 
15 above, issues were pending in the State of Utah. 
16 THE UTAH SUPREME COURT RE: ISSUES OF URESA 
n The purpose of [URESA] is to improve and extend by reciprocal legislation 
18 in separate jurisdictions the enforcement of existing duties of family support. See 
19 NRS 130.030: State ex rel. Welfare Div v. Vine, 99 Nev. 278. 283. 662 P.2d 
20 295, 298 (1983). Generally speaking, [URESA] itself "creates no duties of family 
21 support, but is concerned solely with the enforcement of the already existing 
22 duties when the person to whom a duty is owed is in one state and the person 
23 owing the duty is in another." See Annotation. Construction and Effect of 
24 Provision of Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act. NRS 130.280 (1) 
25 directs that: A support order made by a court of this state pursuant to this 
26 chapter does not nullify and is not nullified by a support order made by a court 
27 of this state pursuant to any other law or by a support order made by a court of 
28 any other state pursuant to a substantially similar law or any other law, 
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regardless of priority of issuance . . .(Emphasis). 31 ALR 4th 347. 351 (1984) 
citing Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act. Commissioner's 
Prefactory Note, 9B U.L.A. 382 (1968); see also NRS 130.280; Vix V. State of 
Wisconson. 100 Nev. 495 686 P.2s 226 (1984) (in URESA proceedings, a court 
only has jurisdiction to order enforcement of pre-existing duties of support). 
Moreover, the remedies provided by the act are "in addition to and not in 
substitution for any other remedies." See NRS 130-050. The act further 
provides that it "shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general 
purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact it." See NRS 
130.020. (Emphasis)PI1 [**6] URESA's choice of law provision provided that 
the "duties of support . . . are those imposed . . . under the laws of any state 
where the obligor was present during the period for which support is sought." 
Utah Code Ann. @> 77-31-7 (1995) (repealed 1997). Thus under URESA, Utah's 
statute of limitations would govern the duration for which support could be 
recovered. . . . However, UIFSA's choice of law provision states that "in a 
proceeding for arrearages, the statute of limitation under the laws of this 
state or of the issuing state, whichever is the longer, applies." Utah Code 
Ann. @ 78-45F-604 (Supp. 1998). 
l 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19| (P.12). The Utah Supreme Court has stated that "statutes of limitations 
20 | are essentially procedural in nature and . . . . do not abolish a substantive right to 
21 I sue . . . "Lee v. Gaufin. 867 P.2d 572. 575 (Utah 1993): See also Financial 
22 Bancoorp. Inc. V. Pingree & Dahle. f**7| Inc.. 880 P2d 14m 16 (Utah ct. App. 
23 1994)_(stating "Utah follows majority position that limitations periods are 
24 generally procedural in nature"). Similarly, UIFSA's choice of law provision does 
25 not establish a substantive right or create a duty of support, but simply changes 
26 the mechanism by which support orders are enforced by instructing the court as 
27 to which law to apply in calculating arrearages. UIFSA merely provides a 
28 I framework for enforcing one states support order in another jurisdiction. 
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1 Undoubtedly, the outcome may differ depending on which statute of limitations is 
2 applied; however, the rights created and possessed by the parties are found in 
3 provisions separate and apart from the choice of law section. . "Full faith and 
4 credit" provisions are outlined in the United f*943] States Constitution. 
5 (Emphasis) 
6 B. Spousal Support Obligation 
7 Utah Code Ann. @ 78-45f-206 (2) (Supp. 1998). ( P26) makes it clear in it's 
8 reference to Spousal Support. In Utah, a court may only modify a spousal support 
9 order issued by another state if the Utah court has "continuing, exclusive 
10 jurisdiction" over the spousal support order. The method of which a Utah court 
11 order obtains "continuing, exclusive jurisdiction" over a spousal support order is 
12 by [*946] "Issuing [**19] a support order consistent with the law of this state . . 
13 ." Utah id. @ 78-45f-205 (6). Thus, a Utah court cannot obtain "continuing, 
14 exclusive jurisdiction unless it issues the spousal support order. . 6). . A 
15 tribunal of this state issuing a support order consistent with the law of this 
16 state has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over a spousal support order 
17 THROUGHOUT THE EXISTENCE OF THE SUPPORT OBLIGATION! Since 
18 1980 the "family Support" orders issued by the state of Utah and collected upon 
19 by the Riverside ORS included both Child support and alimony. All other orders 
20 which are now in dispute are family support orders, with the exception of the 1998 
21 Support Order. The 1995 Order stipulated the amount of spousal support but all 
22 arrearage was family support. 
23 
24 THE UTAH COURT MAY PROPERLY EXERCISE JURISDICTION BECAUSE A 
25 FOREIGN DIVORCE DECREE CAN BE MODIFIED BY A SHOWING OF 
26 CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES. 
27 
28 The Plaintiff asserted the Utah court lacked jurisdiction because the 
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1 decree which the Defendant sought to modify was originally rendered in a 
2 California Court. This is clearly not the law. The Utah Supreme Court stated that 
3 Utah Courts have the jurisdiction to modify the provisions of a foreign divorce 
4 decree if such decree could be modified under the law of the rendering state and 
5 under Utah Law. McLane v. McLane 570 P.2d 692 (1977). 
6 The giving of full faith and credit to the judgement of a sister state simply 
7 requires that it be given the same credit as it would be given in that state; and 
8 also the same credit that it would be given if rendered in the courts of our own 
9 state. With respect to divorce decrees the Utah statute provides that: 
10 The Court shall have continuing jurisdiction to make such 
11 subsequent changes or new orders with respect to the support 
12 and maintenance of the parties, the custody of children and 
13 their support and maintenance. . . as shall be reasonable and 
14 necessary. Even though the decree is res judicata as the 
15 circumstances existing at the time of the decree if there are 
16 changed circumstances so requiring there can be further 
17 adjudication thereon. A Courts decision concerning the amount 
18 of support can, however, be modified at any time during the 
19 support payment period (Civil Code 4801 (a) in remarraige of 
20 Morrison 143 Cal Rptr. 139 573 P.2d 41 . (1978). 
21 A divorce decree can also be modified under Utah law by showing a 
22 change in circumstances. Thus the full faith and credit requirement is met 
23 because the modification sought is appropriate under both California and Utah 
24 law. 
25 In the McLane case involving a custody dispute, the court set forth the 
26 requirements for jurisdiction in a case of this nature. 
27 "The needs of children for sustenance and for protective 
28 I care are continuous and it is essential that wherever 
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1 they may be the court have jurisdiction to safe guard 
2 their interest and welfare. Consequently for that purpose properly 
3 interested parties may invoke the jurisdiction of the court based on 
4 either (1) the domicile of the child or (2) the presence of the child 
5 within the state or (3) in personum jurisdiction over the parties 
6 seeking custody. Furthermore, anyone, or more of those basis is 
7 sufficient foundation for jurisdiction upon which a court may proceed 
8 to hear and determine such controversy. 
9 
10 ALL OTHER JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENTS WERE MET BECAUSE THE 
11 DEFENDANT [RESPONDENT] AND THE CHILDREN OF THE PARTIES WERE 
12 RESIDENTS OF THE STATE OF UTAH AND THE PLAINTIFF HAD 
13 VOLUNTARILY SUBMITTED TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE STATE OF 
14 UTAH BY BRINGING ADDITIONAL ACTIONS. 
15 
16 A summary outline of jurisdictional issues. 
17 Pleading Action YR 
18 Plaintiff Registers California Dissolution Order in Utah 1977 
19 Calif Order: back to Utah 1983 
20 Hosp letter; Utah custody 1983 
21 List of Utah Orders 1978—1998 
22 Utah Jurisdiction, Utah Attorney General 1992 
23 Federal Handbook statutes 
24 Calif AG Office on registering of Utah 2001 orders 2001 
25 Declaration: Plaintiff submits to Utah jurisdiction 1987 
26 Plaintiff s motion: California Does not have jurisdiction. 1983 
27 
28 
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l Respectfully, 
2 
3 Marlene Telford (Lundahl) 
4 InproSe J Date :^ " i > 2004 
5 .-' . : y . i , ; ; * > " ' . •••-•!--{'''e- ; 
6 p.s. An ADDENDUM will follow with supporting motions and statements from the 
7 California Attorney Generals Office and an Amicus Curiae Brief from the Attorney 
8 Generals Office in Texas, filed in the California courts per California AG Office., 
9 Also copies of three (3) letter briefs to be filed in the Appellate Court of California 
10 in deference to a request from the bench. The California Deputy AG; Barry 
11 Brooks Amicus Brief and myself are the participants. 
12 
1 3 I 
14 
15 
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19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
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PROOF OF SERIVCE 
I am over the age of eighteen and not a party to the within action. 
On February 6, 2004 I personally served the foregoing document Opening 
Brief and related documents at the Appellate Court 450 South, State Street, Salt 
Lake City, Utah as well as mailing same documents personally on the interested 
parties in this action. 
Executed on February 6, 2004 at Provo, Utah. 
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Utah that the 
foregoing is true and correct. ^ 
/ /'' 
- r T? ' •* 
Amanda North LS* 
2233 North 800 West 
Linden Utah 
SERVICE LIST 
Mary Dahlberg, Esq Attorney for Intervenor 
Deputy Attorney General (Orange County for Respondent) 
1300 "I" Street, Suite 125 
P.O Box 944255 
Sacramento California,94244-2550 
Appellate Court [8 copies] 
450 South State 
Salt Lake City Utah, 84114 
Barry J. Brooks Amicus Brief, Letter Brief 
3500 Cassava Drive 
Austin, TX 78746-6691 
Judge Claudia Laycock 
Fourth District Court, Utah County 
125 North, 100 West 
Provo, Utah, 84601 
David Drake 
6905 S 1300 East. #248 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Plaintiffs Utah Counsel 
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LAW OFFICES 
CARPELLO, EAGAN, WISHART & HALL 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
3 2 4 SOUTH BREA BOUUEVARO 
BREA, CALIFORNIA 9 2 8 2 1 
( 7 1 4 ) 5 2 9 - O l I t 
Attorneys for R e s p o n d e n t 
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
FOR THE COUNTY OF ORANGE 
In Re the Marriage of: 
Petitioner: RUTH M. LUNDAHL 
and 
Respondent: GERALD D. LUNDAHL 
CASE NUMBER: 51 27 86 
DECLARATION OF GERALD D. 
LUNDAHL 
1, GERALD D. LUNDAHL, declare: 
1 • I am the Respondent in the above-captioned case and am 
personally familiar with all of the facts stated hereinbelow. If 
called upon to testify as to these facts I could and would do so 
competently of my own first-hand knowledge. i ,L* 
/fr 
2, I have been absolutely hounded to deaxh from this woman 
from the time that/she divorced me back in 1^977, Jalmost ten (10) 
years ago, I have voluntarily travelled aTl of the way to Utah 
for the purpose of submitting myself to the jurisdiction of the 
State of Utah to modify all of the many Court Hearings set by my 
ex-wife in that state. Now that she has decided that the State 
of California will provide her with higher child support orders, 
she has returned to the State of California in order to obtain 
- 1-10 
CERTIFIED COPY 
Superior Court of the State of California 
For the County of Orange 
In Re t h e M a r r i a g e o f : 
P e t i t i o n e r : GERALD LUNDAHL 
and 
R e s p o n d e n t : RUTH C. LUNDAHL No. 
D 31 55 62 
DEPOSITION OF GERALD DALE LUNDAHL 
June 3 0 , 1993 
Repoited h\: 
Sherry L. Barnard, 
CSR #4222 
(^tmack 
Cohort han}) (^ReportingworporatioH 
( . tKTIHH) tlloKTIUMJKM'ORn-fc 
1519 East Chapman Avenue.Orange, California 92666. Phone 714/538-2326 or 714/538 3806 
DEPOSITION OF GERALD DALE LUNDAHL taken by the 
Respondent at 333 City Boulevard West, Suite 710; Orange, 
California, on Wednesday, June 30, 1993, commencing at 
9:30 a.m., before Sherry L. Barnard, CSR #4222, pursuant to 
Notice. 
APPEARANCE OF COUNSEL: 
For the Petitioner: 
SONJA H. RHODES 
Attorney at Law 
1820 East 17th Street 
Santa Ana, California 92701 
For the Respondent: 
LAW OFFICES OF SEASTROM & FISHER 
BY: Michael A. Fisher 
Attorney at Law 
333 City Boulevard West, Suite 710 
Orange, California 92668 
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AMACK SHORTHAND REPORTING CORPORATION 
A Yes. 
Q How much are you ordered to pay her on a monthly 
basis? 
A I'm not sure. I have a Utah order. I have a 
California order and I'm not following either. 
Q What does the Utah order say? 
A 3,000 a month family support, 
Q I'm sorry? 
A 3,000 a month family support. 
Q And that would have been for both Marlene and — 
A Kwinci. 
Q — Kwinci; right? 
A Correct. 
Q Have you instituted any action to modify that 
order? 
A Yes. 
Q Has a hearing been set? 
A The next hearing is the 29th of July, but I think 
that's 
been a 
Q 
Marlene 
A 
Q 
A 
a settlement conference. I don't think that there's 
court date set yet. 
Now you're telling me then in the same divorce to 
. there's also a California order? 
Yes. 
What does the California order say? 
That I should be paying her $1250 alimony. 
23 
AMACK SHORTHAND REPORTING CORPORATION 
N 
A No, I have an action in Utah. Riverside 
essentially looked at the thing all in all and said go back to 
Utah; that's where this thing belongs. So right now we have 
split jurisdiction; custody jurisdiction is in California and 
alimony jurisdiction is in Utah. 
Q Does California agree that it no longer has 
jurisdiction over the support issue? 
A Well that's Riverside's opinion. So we have never 
been to court in Riverside. 
MR. FISHER: Let me ask your attorney, even though she 
hasn't been sworn in, we'll trust that she will answer 
honestly. There's an Orange County order that says he's to 
pay $1250 a month in spousal support to Marlene? 
MS. RHODES: I have reviewed the court order; I did not 
represent him at the time. The only work I have done was the 
custody of Kwinci. She came here and got an order in '87, so 
resubmitted herself to California jurisdiction. 
So yes, there is that $1200 order but Utah again 
apparently, as I understand it, reasserted jurisdiction when 
she went there and had a default hearing and got a $3,000 
order- And that Orange County Superior Court found that it 
had jurisdiction to change custody of Kwinci though. And the 
court has made no determination asking for modification of the 
spousal support order at that time-
So he really has three different things going I 
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AMACK SHORTHAND REPORTING CORPORATION 
Barry J. Brooks 3500 Cassava Dr. Austin, TX 78746-1500 
512-460-6691 
October 31,2003 
Honorable Justices Aronson, Bedsworth & Fybel 
4th District Court of Appeal, Division 3 
925 N. Spurgeon Street 
Santa Ana, CA 92702 
RE: G030846 
Lundahl v. Lundahl 
Amicus Letter Brief- due 11/3/03 
Honorable Justices: 
Amicus curiae, Barry J. Brooks, files this reply to the Court's order issued September 30, 2003. 
(1) whether an order denying a petition to vacate registration of an out-of-
state support order is an appealable order 
Amicus will defer to the California attorneys for thorough briefing on this issue. 
(2) whether the Utah state court could issue independent spousal support -
orders on April 21,1991 and April 13,1995 without modifying, superceding, 
or nullifying the parties' 1977 California divorce decree or a 1994 California 
support order 
Amicus curiae would respond that in 1991 and 1995, Utah could only is^ue independent 
spousal support orders. To this day, Utah can not enter an order that modifies, supere^aes, or 
nullifies the spousal support provisions of any California orders. 
The Court in Kammersall made the correct analysis of the effect of multiple support 
orders. That analysis is applicable to this case. Until the enactment of the Full Fath and Credit 
for Child Support Orders Act (FCCSOA, 28 U.S.C.A. 1738B) or the Uniform Interstate Family 
Support Act (UIFSA), states were able to establish multiple child and spousal support orders. As 
Kammersall explains, a subsequent order did not "modify" a previous order. Kammersall v. 
Kammersall 792 P. 2d 496, 498 (Utah 1990). 
Amicus Letter Brief- Page 1 of 7 
The assertion b\ GERALD that a subsequent order is "void and of no force and effect" is 
incorrect. (Appellant's Letter Brief, pg. 5) As the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
It is true that under these acts a 'responding state1 . . . may set a different amount that the 
'obligorXdefendant) must pay, and in that sense there is a * modification1 of an amount, 
but we do not believe and do not hold that the decree of the 'initiating' state . . . was 
modified, vacated, reformed or eliminated. Oglesby v. Oglesby, 510 P,2d 1106, 1107 
(1973). 
This principle is applicable regardless of which order sets the highest amount of support. 
A subsequent order that sets a lower support amount has no mathematical effect on the aggregate 
arrears that may be owed. Conversely, a subsequent order that sets a higher support amount has 
the undeniable effect of being the order used to calculate the aggregate arrears. While the 
subsequent lower order may have no effect on the calculations, it is still a valid order that is in 
force. If the support under the first order terminates earlier than the support under the second; 
obviously, the second order would have force and effect on the ongoing obligation and any 
arrears after the termination of the initial order. 
Reliance on Rimensburger v. Rimensburger, 841, P.2d 709 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) is 
completely misplaced since Utah has correctly held it is only applicable to subject matter 
jurisdiction between two Utah courts. Bankler v. Bankler, 963 P.2d 797, 800 (Utah Ct. App. 
1998). Citing Oglesby, the court in Bankler basically reaffirms the proposition that the ability to 
"modify" its initial order rests solely with the initial court. Id. The Bankler court was not 
presented the issue whether a Utah court could enter a valid, independent, subsequent order in 
the context of there being another state's order. 
One of the major differences between interstate and intrastate family law prior to UIFSA 
and FFCCSOA was the ability of one state to establish an order for prospective support when 
there was an existing order on the same issue in another state. Within many states, there was 
only one court with continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over a support issue. In the interstate 
context, there was no exclusivity principle. There could be several orders from courts in 
different states and each court had continuing jurisdiction over its order. The court also had 
exclusive jurisdiction in the sense that no court in another state could modify or invalidate the 
order. However, there was no exclusivity over the support obligation. This multiplicity of valid 
obligations created the problem that UIFSA was designed to solve. 
The ability and practice of a subsequent court entering a valid child support order in a 
different amount dwindled as states began to adopt UIFSA. A state adopting UIFSA no longer 
Amicus Letter Brief- Page 2 of 7 
had the ability to issue new, subsequent orders. The practice came to a complete halt with the 
enactment of FFCCSOA on October 20, 1994. After that date, a state must give full faith and 
credit to the child support order issue by a another state. New orders are not permitted. Only 
"true modifications" can occur. As the practice of entering subsequent orders ceases, there 
becomes only one tribunal with the exclusive jurisdiction to prospectively modify the support 
obligation. 
Recognizing that multiple, valid orders entitled to full faith and credit had been created, 
both FFCCSOA and UIFSA set up the same mechanism to determine which of the multiple 
orders would control the issue of prospective support. 28 U.S.C.A 1738B(f) & Fam. Code 4911. 
FFCCSOA only applies to child support orders. However, UIFSA as a matter of state law does 
apply to spousal support orders. (Fam. Code § 490 l(r) and (u)) It is premised on there being one 
tribunal with exclusive jurisdiction over all support (child or spouse) obligations. UIFSA 
provides for a very limited circumstance that will allow transfer of the exclusive jurisdiction to 
modify the child support obligation. The distinction between child support and spousal support 
is that once the first tribunal enters an order regarding the spousal support obligation, the 
obligation can only be modified by that tribunal. (Fam. Code § 4909) (Brief of Amicus Curiae 
has already discussed the fact that the determination of controlling order provisions of UIFSA do 
not apply to spousal support orders.) 
(3) whether the Utah state court proceeding that resulted in support orders 
from that court were conducted pursuant to the Revised Uniform Reciprocal 
Enforcement of Support Act, the Utah Foreign Judgment Act, or another 
statute 
Amicus curiae would respond that the initial Utah spousal support order was an 
independent cause of action not conducted pursuant to either the Revised Uniform Reciprocal 
Enforcement of Support Act (RURESA) or the Utah Foreign Judgment Act. 
The resolution of this issue is not dependent on the caption of the pleadings. Often, it is 
not dependent on the imprecise wording of an order. As the court noted in Oglesby, an interstate 
"modification" is not really a modification. Oglesby, supra at 1107. Of greater significance is 
the Utah court's recitation in the 1991 "Order on Order to Show Cause" that the court issued its 
order pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 30-3-5(3). Although this section has been revised since 
1991, the substance remains the same. In pertinent part, it provided in 1991: "The court has 
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continuing jurisdiction to make . . new orders for the support and maintenance of the parties, 
as is reasonable and necessary.1' Utah Code Annotated 30-3-5(3) (revised) 
Any contention by GERALD that Utah can only establish spousal support in the context 
of a divorce, is unavailable. The Utah Supreme Court confirmed that the Uniform Reciprocal 
Enforcement of Support Act (URESA) permitted Utah to establish an independent spousal 
support order. Lamberth v. Lamberth, 550 P.2d 200, 202 (1976) It is interesting to note that the 
court in Lamberth fell into the misnomer addressed by the same court in Oglesby and 
characterized the Utah action as a "reduction" of the support previously ordered. Id The court 
obviously believed the subsequent Utah order was a valid order. 
Amicus would disagree with GERALD that this action for a new spousal support amount 
was pursued under the Utah Foreign Judgments Act. (Appellant's Letter Brief, pg. 8) Bankler is 
correct: 
The Utah Foreign Judgment Act does not confer jurisdiction on a Utah court to 
prospectively modify an order issued by a foreign state cour t . . . . Bankler, supra at 800 
(emphasis added) 
The Utah Foreign Judgments Act is similar to the Foreign Judgment Acts of most states. 
It is a legal construct for enforcing judgments. It is not to be used to establish prospective 
obligations. Its ability to even alter existing judgments is extremely limited. It is a method for 
collection of obligations that have been reduced to a judgment or have become judgments by 
operation of law. 
It is precisely because of the temporal limitations on actions under a Foreign Judgment 
Act that URESA and RURESA were utilized for family support. For cases with no orders, they 
provided a structure for a resident of one state to obtain services in another state for the 
establishment of an order. URESA and RURESA also provided a legal construct for a tribunal in 
one state to issue a new support order for prospective support when there was already an 
existing order in another state: GERALD is correct that the orders in this case were not obtained 
using RURESA. One distinction is that private counsel was used instead of the Department of 
Human Services or the Title IV-D agency.
 ;Ho we ver, the use of RURESA is not dispositive of 
the validity of the order. 
The version of RURESA used by Utah acknowledged: "The remedies herein provided are 
in addition to and not in substitution for any other remedies". Utah Code Ann. 77-31-3 
(repealed). It further provided: "'Support order' means any judgment, decree or order of support, 
. . . regardless of the kind of action in which it is entered" and "'Duty of support' includes any 
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dutv of support imposed 01 imposable b\ law or b> an> court order, decree or judgment 
whether incidental to a pioceedmg for divorce, legal separation, separate maintenance or 
otherwise" Utah Code Ann 77-3 1-2(10) and Utah Code Ann 77-3 1-2(6) ( both repealed) 
Clearly, at the time the Utah court entered its orders, RURES A was not the exclusive means to 
obtain spousal support in Utah As the Utah court noted, the duty of support in this case was 
imposable under Utah Code Ann 30-3-5(3) and was imposed by a court order in a proceeding for 
separate maintenance 
(4) whether the September 22, 2003 Utah state court order has been appealed 
and if so, the effect of the pendency of that appeal on this proceeding 
Amicus curiae can only hope that the 2003 Utah state court rulings will ultimately be 
reviewed by a competent court Not only is it incorrect in this case, but, it misconstrues the 
entire jurisprudence of Utah. 
As previously discussed, to the extent the Utah court was "purporting to modify" the 
existing California order, it was not a true "modification". Thus, the first issue decided in the 
2003 Utah ocder is not factually correct. To be sustained, the decision would have to be re-
characterized as a finding in 2003 that the same court did not have jurisdiction to enter its 
independent order in 1995. The fallacy of this has been discussed as well. The Utah court's 
holding that it is invalidating the April 13, 1995 Order has the effect of reinstating the original 
1991 Order. If this ruling is correct, GERALD actually owes support at the higher 1991 rate. 
The ruling does nothing to invalidate the Judgment obtained in 1999. It should be noted that the 
arguments being made now were available in 1999 but were not raised either at the hearing that 
lead to the judgment nor in any appeal. The incorrectness of the ruling is also apparent since the 
1995 order modified the 1991 Utah order, not any California order. 
The second issue ruled upon by the court in the 2003 Utah order is essentially the same as 
the first and the associated problems are the same as discussed above. 
Assuming the court's third ruling is upheld, it will resolve the issue first propounded to 
amicus curiae - the determination of a prospectively controlling order. If Utah is now deferring 
exclusive jurisdiction over spousal support to California, then prospective support will be what 
California determines. However, this ruling can only be prospective. 
Apparently, the Utah court was lead to believe that waiving the wand of UIFSA over the 
case would solve all issues. Thus, the court decided to apply UIFSA retroactively and 
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unconditionally The application is not that simple GERALD would have this court believe that 
"'the trend" is to use UIFSA to declare all subsequent orders enteied using URESA, RURES A, 01 
some other remedy are superfluous and void ab initio (Appellant's Letter Brief, pg 9 citmg State 
of Utah, Dept of Human Services v Jacoby\ 975 P 2d 939 (Utah Ct App 1999)) No state had 
gone that far This interpretation of retroactivity would mean the section on determining the 
controlling order in a multiple order situation is truly superfluous (See Fam Code § 4911) 
Likewise, the section on simultaneous credit for payments under multiple orders, a key pro\ ision 
of URESA and RURESA, is meaningless, (See Fam. Code § 4913) If all subsequent orders are 
now void in Utah, actions for refunds when those orders were higher should soon abound. The 
holding does not make it clear if it applies to all subsequent orders from all states that are now 
being enforced in Utah or it applies to all subsequent Utah orders regardless of where they are 
being enforced. It is obviously this last application that GERALD is wanting to foist upon this 
court. Being stated without any restrictions, the ruling would apply to both child and spousal 
support orders. 
What Jacoby held is that the procedural aspects of UIFS A can be applied retroactively. 
Id. at 942. This is the corollary to the "general rule followed in Utah" that the substantive law in 
effect at the time the action was initiated governs the action. Wilde v. Wilde, 969 P.2d. 438 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1998) Surely, GERALD will not contend that retroactively invalidating all support 
orders that were valid at the time of entry is only "procedural'5. It is also doubtful that Utah 
intends this wholesale invalidation to be its jurisprudence. 
Proper resolution of this and future cases depends upon the correct interpretation and 
application of interstate family law concepts. It is certainly understandable that this court must 
factor in the effect of an appeal of the 2003 Utah order into its decision. Amicus curiae would 
suggest there is an approach that would enable all issues to be resolved instead of continuing the 
multi-state litigation. In the 2003 order, the Utah court cedes continuing, exclusive jurisdiction 
over the spousal support issue to competent courts in California. Under Utah law, the issue of 
whether a law operates retroactively is a question of law and no deference to the decision of a 
district court must be given. Jacoby, supra at 941. In addition, the issue of retroactivity of 
UIFSA is a lynchpin of GERALD's argument in California that Utah lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction to enter its orders. Thus, this court can accept the tender of continuing, exclusive 
jurisdiction, combine it with the issue having been raised in California, and apply Utah law to 
decide UIFSA does not apply retroactively to void all subsequent orders entered in cases with 
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existing oiders ff the premise that UIFS \ applies retroacti\ ely to m\ alidate all subsequent 
orders is found to be incorrect, then at the time of entry of the orders in this case, Utah law 
allowed subsequent spousal support orders to be established using either general family law 
provisions or RURJESA, so the orders entered by Utah are valid Valid sister state judgments are 
entitled to full faith and credit meaning GERALD owes all missed payments of spousal support 
calculated using the highest order in existence at the time. 
If this court want to further assure the correctness of its rulings, UIFS A facilitates this. 
Tribunals can communicate with each other. If it so desires, this court is certainly able to contact 
any appropriate court in Utah for assistance in resolving any matters in this case. (Fam. Code § 
4931) Ultimately, the goal of resolving interstate family law issues must be a body of law that is 
founded on fundamental concepts shared by all states. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Bfolfy4?Brooks 
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RE Landahl v. Lundahl 
4th District Court of Appeal, Division 3. Case No. GO30846 
LETTER BRIEF 
Dear Justice Sills: 
As ordered by the court on September 30, 2003, respondent Orange County Department 
of Child Support Services files this letter brief on the following issues: 
1) Whether an order denying a petition to vacate registration of an out-of-
state support order is an appealable order; 
2) Whether the Utah state court could issue independent spousal support 
orders on April 21, 1991 and April 13, 1995 without modifying, superceding, or 
nullifying the parties' 1977 California divorce decree or a 1994 California support 
order; 
3) Whether the Utah state court proceedings that resulted in support orders 
from that court were conducted pursuant to the Revised Uniform Reciprocal 
Enforcement of Support Act (URESA), the Utah Foreign Judgment Act (UFJA), 
or another statute; and 
4) Whether the September 22, 2003 Utah state court order has been appealed 
and, if so, the effect of the pendency of that appeal in this proceeding. 
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1) APPEALABILITY 
The court directed the parties to Cowan v. Moreno (Tex.Ct.App. 1995) 903 S.W.2d 119, 
124 [order under Uniform Interstate Family Support Act not appealable], Fishman v. Fishman 
(1981) 117 Cal.App 3d 815, 819 [order under Sister State Money Judgment Act (SSMJA) 
appealable], and code of Civil Procedure section 1710.10, subdivision (c) [SSMJA not applicable 
to support orders]. The Department asserts this order is not appealable, but the purported appeal 
should be considered by this court as a petition for writ of prohibition. The Department takes this 
position because the current spousal support order became enforceable when the registration was 
confirmed thus placing Mr. Lundahl in a position of needing immediate relief if his argument is 
ultimately accepted. The Department also believes this course will conserve judicial resources 
because an appeal will be most likely be filed again after the trial court determines the arrears 
under the Utah orders. 
The Cowan trial court confirmed the registration but specifically declined to rule on the 
decree's enforceability and did not set the arrears. (Cowan v. Moreno, supra, 903 S.W.2d at p. 
121.) The Texas Court of Appeals held that the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA) 
controlled the registration because the registration was filed in Texas after its enactment. (Id. at 
p. 122.) The court went on to hold that under UIFSA, the petition to register raises the issue of 
enforcement of arrearages. (Id. at p. 123.) Furthermore, since the order to be registered was 
valid on its face, it could only be attacked upon specific limited grounds such as lack of personal 
jurisdiction or some procedural defect that would render the decree void. (Ibid.) "There is no 
defense . . . to the registration of a valid foreign support order.' UIFSA § 606, Comment, 9 
U.L.A 126, 160(Supp. 1994)." (Ibid.) The court held that Cowan's pleading challenged the 
amount of the arrears, which relates to enforceability rather than to the existence of the support 
order. (Id. at pp. 123-124.) Since the trial court expressly declined to establish the arrears, 
reserving the issue for later hearing, the order was interlocutory. (Id. at p. 124.) The appeal was 
dismissed because there was no jurisdiction to appeal an interlocutory order. (Ibid) 
This case stands on very nearly the same footing. The order on appeal denied Mr. 
Lundahl's request to vacate the registration, but specifically continued the issue of the amount of 
arrears owed. (Appellant's Appendix (AA) Vol. II, p. 394.) The issue of arrears was later taken 
off calendar until this appeal has been concluded. (Motion for Judicial Notice, Exhibit A)1 This 
is thus an interlocutory order and the appeal should be dismissed. 
The order on appeal in Fishman was an order denying registration of a New York order 
for attorney fees in a dissolution action. (Fishman v. Fishman, supra, 117 Cal.App.3d at p. 818.) 
1
 The Department has filed a motion for judicial notice to include the minute order taking 
the issue of arrears off calendar simultaneously with this letter brief. 
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The obligee registered the order under the Sister State Money Judgment Act (Code Civil Proa, 
§§ 1710.10, et seq ) {Ibid) The court held that this was appealable as an order on a motion to 
vacate the registration of a sister state money judgment. {Id. at p. 819.) The court did not 
analyze appealability under URESA The court held that whether the New York order was a 
"support order" governed by URESA or not, it was properly registered under the SSMJA 
because URESA was not designed to limit remedies but to add remedies to obligees in support 
actions. {Id. at p. 821-822 ) The court summed up its holdings by stating that the New York 
order was a money judgment, it was final, for a liquidated sum, and it was nonmodifiable. {Id. at 
p. 823.) Fishman is thus distinguishable from this case because the order from Utah is a support 
order registered under UIFS A and not liquidated. Furthermore, it is clear that support orders are 
not included in the definition of "sister state judgment" in Code of Civil Procedure section 
1710.10, subdivision (c). The analysis under Fishman does not apply in this case. 
Mr. Lundahl argues that this case is appealable because the Utah orders, having been 
registered in California, are immediately enforceable. (Letter Brief, p. 2.) He looks for support of 
his contention in the holding from In re Marriage of Adams (1987) 188 Cal. App.3d 863 which 
stated that "'Such postjudgment order, which relates to enforcement of the judgment, is 
appealable. [Citation.]'" {Id. at p. 688.) However, "such postjudgment order" in that case 
related specifically to a postjudgment order granting or denying motions under former Civil Code 
section 5124, which related to community property settlements and military retirements within 
certain time limits. {Id. at p. 686, fn. 3.) This case does not involve any order of that type. 
Generally, the main basis for appeals in family law and other civil matters is Code of Civil 
Procedure section 904.1, which codifies the "one final judgment rule" and provides that only final 
judgments are appealable. Labels affixed by the trial court cannot determine appealability, rather 
it is the substance and effect of the court's order or judgment that must be considered. {In re 
Marriage ofLoya (1987) 189 Cal. App. 3d 1636, 1638.) Family Code section 3554 provides that 
"[a]n appeal may be taken from an order or judgment under this division [Division 9 Support] as 
in other civil actions." (Fam. Code, § 3554.) Nevertheless, a judgment must fully dispose of the 
litigated matter, i.e., there must be a final determination of the parties' rights, before an appellate 
court will entertain an appeal. {In re Marriage of Griffin (1993) 15 Cal. App. 4th 685, 689.) 
This order does not fully dispose of the issues before the court because Mr. LundahTs 
arrearage obligation was continued to a future date, since taken off calendar due to this appeal 
Having shown that this order is not appealable, the Department nonetheless requests this 
court to rule on the issues because Mr. Lundahl could be prejudicially harmed if this court 
declines to hear the matter now. The Utah spousal support order became enforceable 
immediately upon confirmation of registration. Mr. Lundahl's petition for writ of supercedeas 
was denied. Furthermore, an opinion from this court would promote judicial economy by making 
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unnecessary the filing of a new appeal after the trial court sets the arrears under the Utah orders. 
This court has jurisdiction to deem the appeal to be a petition for writ of prohibition (Olson v. 
Cory (1983) 35 Cal 3d 390, 400 ) The record is adequate to demonstrate that immediate review 
is necessary to protect all of the parties 
2) EFFECT OF THE 1991 AND 1995 UTAH ORDERS ON THE 1977 
CALIFORNIA DISSOLUTION ORDER 
The Department adopts the argument of amicus curiae regarding this issue - the Utah 
orders did not modify the California orders, they were independent orders running concurrently 
and adds the following. 
Under URESA, child and spousal support were treated identically. (Sampson, Uniform 
Interstate Family Support Act (1996) Fam. L. Q., Summer 1998, Prefatory Note, at 403.) It is 
well-settled law that the responding state in a URES A action could not modify a support order 
from another state without clearly stating that the new judgment modified the previous judgment 
and only then with proper notice and opportunity to be heard. (See former Fam. Code, § 4840 
(repealed by stats. 1997, ch. 194, § 1); In re Marriage of Ward (1994) 29 Cal. App.4th 1452, 
1456-1457; In re Marriage of Popenhager (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 514, 521-522.) Instead the 
responding state entered a de novo order. (Kathleen A. Burdette, Making Parents Pay: Interstate 
Child Support Enforcement after United States v. Lopez (Apr. 1996), 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1469, 
1484.) The two judgments ran concurrently and payments to one were credited against the other. 
(Former Fam. Code, § 4840.) If an obligor chose to pay on the lower order, arrears would accrue 
under the higher order to account for the difference. This is what happened in this case. 
Kammersell v. Kammersell (Utah 1990) 792 P.2d 496 is in accord with this reasoning. In 
Kammersell, a Pennsylvania court, responding to a request from Utah to enforce a Utah order, 
entered a lower support amount. (Kammersell, supra, 792 P.2d at p. 496-497.) The Utah court 
held that Pennsylvania had not modified the Utah order because it did not specifically provide that 
it was a modification as required by URESA (Id at p. 498-499.) Since it was the Utah order 
that was higher, the court was not required to review the validity of the Pennsylvania order -
arrears had accrued under the higher Utah order. (Id, at p. 498.) 
As amicus curiae pointed out, Mr. Lundahl's reliance on Rimensburger v. Rimensbarger 
(Utah.Ct. App. 1992) 841 P.2d 709 is misplaced. That opinion was interpreting Utah's intrastate 
transfer of jurisdiction and found that, internally, one district court did not have jurisdiction to 
modify the orders of another district court. (Id. at p. 710.) It did not address the issue of 
establishing a de novo order. 
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3) WERE THE UTAH PROCEEDINGS CONDUCTED PURSUANT TO 
URESA, UFJA, OR OTHER STATUTE? 
The Department adopts the argument of amicus curiae that the Utah spousal support order 
was not issued pursuant to URESA or UFJA In this case, the action in Utah began as a civil 
complaint by Mr. Lundahl to enforce his visitation rights. The Utah court had jurisdiction to 
entertain an order for support in such an action. (See, e g , Utah Codes Annotated 1953 § 
30-3-3 [in any action to establish an order for parent-time, the court may order a party to provide 
support for the other party during the pendency of the action].) 
4) THE SEPTEMBER 22, 2003, UTAH ORDER HAS BEEN APPEALED 
Respondent, Ruth Telford (Lundahl) filed a notice of appeal with the Utah Court of 
Appeals on October 2, 2003. (Motion for Judicial Notice, Exhibits B, C.) 
The Department adopts and joins in the argument of amicus curiae regarding the errors of 
the 2003 Utah order 
The order in Utah appears to be in response to a motion to strike respondent's order to 
show cause filed by Mr. Lundahl on March 4, 2003, while this appeal was pending. (Motion for 
Judicial Notice, Exhibit B, p. 13.) The Order to Show cause was issued on May 29, 2002, and 
Mr. Lundahl was served on June 22, 2002. {Id. at p. 11) These dates are significant when it is 
noted that the order on appeal in California was entered May 3, 2002, (AA Vol. II, p. 393), and 
the notice of appeal in California was filed on July 2, 2002 (AA Vol. II, pp. 396-397). 
Furthermore, at least part of the delay in hearing the order to show cause in Utah was because 
Mr. Lundahl filed a federal action, naming some of the judges in Utah as defendants, which 
required recusal. (Motion for Judicial Notice, Exhibit B, p. 12.) 
CONCLUSIONS 
1) This court should hear the matter on the merits, whether as an appeal or petition for 
writ of prohibition. 
2) The Utah and California orders are concurrent orders, neither state having jurisdiction 
to modify the other state's judgments. 
3) The Utah orders were entered in a civil action initiated by Mr. Lundahl to enforce his 
visitation rights. 
^\ / f? 
Hon David G Sills, Presiding Justice 
October 31, 2003 
Page 6 
4) The 2003 Utah order is on appeal and should not effect this court's consideration of 
the issues 
Respectfully submitted, 
BILL LOCKYER 
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